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Draft Recommendation
on Europe's role in the prevention and management of crises in the Balkans
The Assembly,
(t) Aware that the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement is obviousll' a long drau,n-out
process u,hrch cannot be accelerated b1' force,
0i) Satisfied that the Agreement on Military aspects of the Peace Settlement rs being rmplemented
without major friction or delay,s;
(tii) Notrng that the OSCE is reported to be satisfied rvith the implementation of the June 1996 sub-
regronal arms control agreement;
(*) Increasingly u'orried, however, that the US-sponsored equip and tram prograrnme for the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, possibly in combination n'rth a parallel unofficial acquisition and
training progralnme, may provide the Bosnian Muslims rvith a qualitatrve milrtary edge and create an
imbalance rvhrch the June 1996 agreement sought to rectif;,',
(") Noting that implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton peace agreement rs making only
verl' slow' progress, as can been seen from the long list of shortcomings mentioned in thc 30 Mav polrtr-
cal declaration by the ministerial meetrng of the Stcering Board of the Peace Implementatron Councrl in
Slntra:
(v) Recalling that implementatron of the nght of all refugees and displaced persons freell' to retum
to their homes of origin, as strpulated rn Artrcle I of fuincx 7, rs a fundamental element of the Darton
Agreement's objectrve of reinslating the pre-conflrct multi-ethnrc soclety of Bosnia and Herzegovrna.
(wr) Noting that at present, out of a total of around 500 000 refugees and displaced persons uho are
entitled to return to therr orm homes in mmonty areas, fewer than 30 000 have actualll'done so.
(vri) Convtnced that the local elections of 13-14 September 1997 cannot be consrdered as having
been successful unless thel' are follou'ed by a return, albeit gradual and over trme, of all refugees and
displaced persons to their orrginal homes, but aware that thrs can onl1, happen rf a substantial number of
foreign ground troops remarn rn Bosnra and Herzegovina for some trme to come rn order to guarantee a
secure envlrorunent,
(ig Conl'rnced that rvestem Europe and other states havrng an intcrest ln peace and sccuntl' rn thc
Balkans should do every.thing possible to actively' support the democratrsatron and transformation of
oligarchrc, drctatorial and natronalist pou'er structures m Bosnia and Herzegovrna. Croatra and the Fcd-
eral Repubhc of Yugoslavia,
(r) Convmced that the identrficatron of mrssrng persons rs an essentral part of the reconcrhatron
process. but au'are that local authorrtres are often obstructrng such identificatron.
(n) Reconfirmrng rts convlctton that therc can be no reconcrliation in Bosrua and Herzegovlna un-
less all mdtvrduals rndrcted for u'ar crlmes commrtted during thc conflrct rn former Yugoslavra havc
bcen;udged b1' The Hague tnbunal.
(nt) Convtnced that the balanced reconstructron and economrc dcvelopment of Bosnra and Herze-
govina requlre financral and economrc ard to be evcnly drstributed to both entrtres.
(nrt) Au'are. hou'ever. that rn certaln parts of the country forergn ard urll not go to those sectors of
thc soctcty' u'hrch need tt most as long as the economy rs m the stranglehold of a feu rndrvrduals holdrng
the rerns of porvcr.
(nv) Constdenng that the pace at u.htch minc-cleanng operatrons 
- 
partlr' funded by,the EU 
- 
are
currentlv berng conducted rn Bosnra and Hcrzegovrna b1'the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs under SFOR
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supervision is so slow that clearing the onc mrllion or so mines still remaining rvrll take around 30 years
at the present rate,
(*) Taking into account paragraph I of the Council's reply to Recommendation 604 according to
rvhich a role is envrsaged for WEU in the European Unron's joint actions on anti-personnel mines,
(xui) Noting that the re-estabhshment of the rule of larv in Bosnia and Herzcgovina rvith the help of
the IPTF is essential if the Dayton peace agreement is to havc a lasting effect;
(xvii) Convrnced that thc IPTF could implement rts mandate even more cffectively rvrth thc assistance
of a substantial, additional unit of rvell-trained, u,ell-equipped and experienccd police officers from
WEU countries, drau'ing on the experience of earller operations - in partrcular the task force in Mostar,
the Danube embargo operation and the continuing work of the Multrnatronal Advisory Pohce Element
(MAPE) rn Albanra;
(xvu) Noting that such a unit from WEU countries should be able to continue its task under WEU
command if, for financial or other reasons, the United Nations decrded not to prolong the mandate of thc
IPTF;
(xix) Noting that the estabhshment of democratic structures rvill never be successful if there are no
independent medra and rffreedom ofexpression is not guaranteed;
(xx) Noting that the need for a substantial SFOR successor force including Unrted States and Rus-
sian ground forces after June 1998 is beyond any doubt;
(xrl) Convrnced that thrs SFOR successor force can onl1, be effective rf rt meets the follorvrng critena.
- 
a mandate covenng a period of at least three to five years, includrng srx-monthly reviews of
the situatron,
- 
an irutral strength of 25 000 to 30 000 troops, to be reduced if circumstances allox';
- 
hrgh mobilrty'and a structure rvith smaller and more flexrble units.
- 
effectrve drstributron over the rvhole territory of Bosnia and Herzcgovina, concentratmg on
areas uhich are knorw to be potential troublespots.
- 
assertlveness under all circumstances,
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL
I Stronglv endorse the estabhshment of an SFOR successor force under NATO command u'ith a
mandate covenng a penod of at least three to five years u,rth the full participatron of contingents of US
and Russran ground troops,
2 Consider the possrbilrtr'. in the light of rts expenence with the WEU pohce force rn Mostar and
the MAPE rn Albanra, of estabhshrng a WEU pohce force u'hich could rnitrally assrst the IPTF under
that command and latcr rcplace rt. rf need be, under WEU command u,ith the same general mandate and
the possibilitl' of implementing rt rvithout sy'stematicalll, calhng on SFOR 
- 
or its successor force 
- 
for
support, u'hrle demonstratrng a European determinatron to fulfil rts responsibilrtres for burlding and
maintaining peace, secunty and stabilrtl' rn Europe,
3 Ask the Plannrng Cell to folloiv closell, developments not only rn Albanra. rvhere the MAPE is
engaged rn an rmportant task. but also m Kosovo and FYROM u'here \\'orsenlng rnter-ethnic relations
are far from reassunng, and to dralv up contrngencv plans rn coordinatron u,rth NATO, rncludrng thc
use of combmed jornt task forces in order to be prepared for the deplormcnt of a European force for
cnsrs pre!'entron and management on the spot:
4 Endeavour to rntensifv humanitarian minc-cleanng opcratrons on the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovrna. among other things, by developing more local trainrng capabrlitres and dissemrnating more
information on Iandmrne detection and clearance
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Explanatory M emor andu m
(submitted by Mr Blaauw, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. In autumn 1996, your Rapporteur pre-
pared a report on "The role of Europe in Bosnia
and Herzegovina" rvhich provided an assessment
of the implementation of the Dalton Agreement.
The report focused rn particular on the Agree-
ment on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement
and on the role of the Implementatron Force
(IFOR) rvhrch was supposed to pull out at the
end of 1996.
2. It concluded that an IFOR successor force
was needed to facilrtate further implementation of
the Dayton Agreement and also to provide Bos-
nia and Herzegovina with a breathing space. The
Assembly's Standing Committee endorsed this
conclusion by adopting Recommendatron 600 on
l7 October 1996.
3. In accordance with a general agreement
among both the countries participatrng in IFOR
and the former \\/arrlng parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it u'as decided that IFOR rvould be
succeeded bv a Stabihsation Force (SFOR)
rvhich u'as to u'ithdrarv completely, by the end of
June 1998
4. The present report provides an up-to-date
assessment of the situatron in Bosnia and Herze-
govina and the implementation of the Dayton
Agreement It also reviews the situation in other'
parts of former Yugoslavia and Albania and
attempts to draw, some conclusrons about the role
of Europe in connectron with peace and secuntv
in the Balkans.
II. Implementation of the Dayton
Agreement
5 The ministerial meetings of the North At-
lantrc Councrl and the Peace Implementation
Council Steering Board m Sintra, Portugal, at the
end of Mav 1997. provrded an appropriate op-
porlunlty for a serrous assessment of the situa-
tion in Bosnra and Herzegovrna These meetings
appear to have been a turning point since none of
the authorities rnvolved sa\\, an),good reason to
conceal the truth an1, longer.
6. In therr final communique of 29 May,
Ministers of the North Atlantic Council first
made mention of some progress in the rmplemen-
tation of the Dalton Agreement, stating
*We 
recognise that important and demon-
strable progress has been made in the
overall effort to rmplement the Peace
Agreement since rve last met. Municipal
elections are scheduled, the sensitive
Brcko decision is being implemented, and
there have been positive developments in
the initiation ofjoint institutions, the return
of refugees and displaced persons and in
economic reconstruction. We are greatly
encouraged b1, the effective cooperatlon
between SFOR and the High Representa-
trve and the international orgarusatrons and
agencies."
7 . In the following paragraph, horvever, the
Ministers made it crystal clear that in fact there
was little reason to be satisfied, and mentioned a
whole list of items in respect of rvhich the partres
had failed to meet their obligations. expressing
their oprnron as follorvs'
"Nevertheless, significant challenges re-
mam and the failure of all the parties to
the Peace Agreement to complr,fully rvith
their commitments cannot be tolerated.
Reaffirmrng our commitment to the full
implementatron of the Peace Agreement,
we express our serious concern at the lack
of determmatron by the authorities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to honour their
obligations and strongly urge them
to establish functioning central rnstr-
tutions;
- 
to ensure freedom of movement. frce-
dom of communication and freedom of
the press;
to respect human rights, the rule of lair
and the nght of all refugees and drs-
placed persons to return freelv,
to cooperate fully rvrth the rnternational
communrty, ln preparing- conductrng
and lmplementing the mun-rcrpal
elections.
to cooperate ivith the Intematronal
Criminal Tribunal for thc former
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Yugoslavia in The Hague in the aP-
prehension and bnnging to lustice of
lvar criminals;
- 
to implement fully the provisions of the
arms control agreement;
- 
to adopt and implement the economic
measures necded for the functioning of
Bosnta and Herzegovina as a single
state; and
- 
to develop democratic, restructured
police forces."
8. The final communique of the ministenal
meeting of the Steenng Board of the Peace Im-
plementatron Council (PIC) rvas even more out-
spoken rn expressing discontent rvith the situa-
tron. The Steering Board "unanlmously agreed
that all the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovma
are failing to live up fully to their obligations
under the Peace Agreement, and that this is un-
acceptable".
9. As a result of the PIC meetrng in Sintra,
Bosnia and Herzegovina's polrtical leaders u'ere
given a checklist of laws to be passed, rvith
deadlines set and the threat of penalties for any
farlures.
10. The first deadlure, I August, has already
caused a shou'doun The central goverffnent
had been told to agree on the appointment of joint
ambassadors, corrrmon citizenship and passports,
and the reopening of airports b1' that date. When
the deadhne uas not met, a number of countries
suspended relattons rvrth the embassies of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. At the time of rvriting this re-
port, an agreement has been reached on the ap-
porntment of ambassadors and relattons that were
suspended have been restored (see paragraph
l9), but the other problems have not y'et been
satisfactorrly resolved
I I After the negative assessment of the rmple-
mentatron process, rvrth the September munrcipal
electrons rn srght and a diffrcult decrsron to be
taken on u'hat to do after the end of the SFOR
mandate, the United States realised that it u'as
vrtal to step up pressure on the three parties.
Smce then, progress has been made but at far too
slou' a pacc In June and July, the Foreign
Secretarres of the United States and the United
Kingdom each vtstted Bosnia and Herzegovtna
and each of them read the riot act to the politrcal
leaders of the country in very straightfonvard
and undiplomatic language.
12. At the beginning of August, tt rvas the turn
of fuchard Holbrooke, the US envov, to visit the
signatories of the Dayon Agreement to try to
accelerate the process and keep rt moving for-
rvard. At the request of the United States, the
Presrdents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herze-
govina mct on 6 August in Split lvhere thel'
promrsed to cooperate in order to promote peace,
establish a cooperation council, create border
controls according to international standards at
their common border and facilitate the return of
refugees.
13. The Dayton Agreement was never intended
to be perfeclon incarnate All the parties in-
volved in its genesis are arvare of thrs. as well as
of the fact that its signatories are no saints. Un-
der the given circumstances, however. with each
party pursuing drfferent oblecttves. it was
probably the best possible solution. But it should
be remembered that the Agreement is an tntncate
jigsaw ptzzle in rvhich all the preces are inter-
dependent. If the civilian parts are not imple-
mented, there is little doubt that the fragile peace
rvill collapse as soon as the foreign mrlitary
peace rmplementatton forces have left It would
seem that, in one $'a1, 61 another, both the Croats
through Presidcnt Tudlman and the Muslims
through President Izetbegovic could be per-
suaded, if they are not already, of the importance
of implementing the civrlian provisions of Day-
ton, among other things b1' promises of badly-
needed economic ard if they' compll'
14. The main obstacle remalns the obstructive
leaders in Repubhka Srpska. rn partrcular Rado-
van Karadzic. and other suspected uar crlmtnals
indicted by the Tnbunal rn The Hague rvho are
not only still at hbertl', but are also runntng
towns, villages and pohce forccs In fact, none
of the jornt rnstituttons as strpulated rn the Da1'-
ton Agreement is rvorking and manv are not even
being estabhshed
III. The Constitution
15 Some hard-\\on progress has been made
on implcmentatron of the Constitutron of Bosnia
and Herzegovina uhich u-as agreed upon as
Annex 4 to the Darton Agreement
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16. On 30 November 1996, after nine earlier
meetings on this issue, the three members of the
loint Presidency reached agreement on the for-
mation of a tu'elve-member central government
as provided for in Article V.4 of the Constitution.
It rvas agreed that the Council of Ministers would
be led jointly by two presidents, one Serb and
one Muslim, assisted by a Croat vice-president.
It would further be comprised of a Croat minister
for foreign affairs, a Mushm minister for exter-
nal trade and a Serb minister for civil affairs and
communicatrons, each to be assisted by trvo
deputy ministers. The nerv Council of Ministers
was confirmed by Parliament on 3 lanuary 1997.
17. On 20 June 1997, the Parliament of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina passed larvs to create a
central bank, common currency, customs union
and common external tariffs. The central bank
ma1', however, consist of trvo or three units with
each holding its own reserves and no deadline has
been set for the introduction of a common cur-
rency.
18. On a visit to Sara.;evo on 23 June 1997,
the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana,
admitted that there had been lrttle progress so far
and that there was scant political wrll to establish
the truly unified state which u,as the ultimate
objective of the Dayton Agreement. The planned
signing of an agreement betu'een the three parties
on crvil air traffic control did not take place be-
cause of last-minute Bosnian-Serb oblections.
19 In a shorv-down over a new list of ambas-
sadors to represent Bosrua abroad in rvhich the
United States and several European countries
severed contacts rvrth the Ambassadors of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the Bosnian collegial presi-
dency finally concluded an agreement at the be-
ginnrng of August 1997. Under the agreement,
there rvtll be l3 Muslrn ambassadors (includrng
one to the United Natrons rn Nerv York and one
to the OSCE), I I Serbs (rncludrng one to the
United States and to the Unrted Nations rn
Geneva) and 8 Croats (includrng one to the
European Unron). This agreement led to thc
hfting of the abovementioned sanctron
20. During that same meeting, the collegial
presidency agreed on the creation of a Standing
Committee on Military Matters to coordinate the
actrvitres of armed forces in Bosnia and Herze-
govma as stipulated in Artrcle V 5 of the Consti-
tution (Annex 4 to the Dalton Agrecment)
Accordrng the the NATO Secretary-General,
Javier Solana, this Standing Committee rvrll be a
military interlocutor for NATO and SFOR rn
Bosnia.
21. On 12 September, Bosnian government
authorities signed a memorandum of understand-
ing on the opening of the airports of Tuzla, Banja
Luka and Mostar to commercial air traffrc.
22. Political leaders in Pale failed to agree on
a new Bosnian citizenship and passport law as
stipulated in Article 1.7 of the Constitution of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Annex 4 to the Dalton
Agreement) by a nerv 3l August 1997 deadline
rvhich was an extension of the earlier I August
deadline set by the PIC declaration in Srntra on
30 May last.
IV. Refugees and displaced persons
23. Of all the annexes to the Dalton Agree-
ment, Annex 7, the Agreement on Refugees and
Displaced Persons, may'well be the most diffrcult
to implement The basic principles of this
agreement are formulated rn Article I of this
Agreement which stipulates:
"All refugees and displaced persons have
the right freelv to return to their homes of
origin."
The Agreement further contains many guaran-
tees for a return in safety and without any nsks.
24. A look at the figures as knoun by SFOR
at the beginning of August 1997 makes it clear
horv lrttle progress has been made in this field
25. It should be noted that refugees are per-
sons who went to another countn' after leavrng
their home or having been expelled from them
Displaced persons are those rvho left or \\'ere ex-
pelled from their homes but staved rvithrn the
borders of Bosnia and Herzegovrna According
to SFOR, there are now an estimated 800 000
refugees and 800 000 displaccd persons Around
400 000 refugees arc in rvestern Europe. ii,ith the
vast majority in ucstern Germanl' An estimated
70%o or 1.12 mrlhon of the total l6 mrllion
should 
- 
accordrng to the Agreement 
- 
return to
arcas u'here their ethnic group is in a mrnoritv.
For most of these persons, there rs lrttle or no
chance of returnrng to their onginal homes.
Many of those returnlng are being ''relocatcd"
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26. In 1996 and from January to July 1997, a
total number of 153 039 refugees retumed to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of these, only an esti-
mated 27 000 returned to a minority area, with
78%o going to the Bosnian-controlled part of the
Federation, 18% to the Croat-controlled part of
the Federation and 4% to Repubhka Sryska.
27 . Accordrng to figures from the Office of the
Special Envoy of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees only l%o returned to
minority areas rn Republika Srpska in the period
I January to 3l July 1997.
28. In its Declaration of 30 May, the PIC
rightly stated that unless and until a process is set
in train to facilitate the return of refugees and
displaced persons to their pre-war homes m a
peaceful, orderly and phased manner, there will
be continued instabrlity in Bosnia. The Declara-
tion further mentioned that steps had to be taken
to permit them to return to Drvar, Sarajevo,
Brcko, Banja Luka and numerous other cities It
rnsisted that current property laws place insur-
mountable Iegal barriers in the path of anyone
returning to his home and called for the Federa-
tion and Republika Srpska to amend their prop-
erff larvs.
29. On 2 and 3 August 1997 , a number of
violent rncidents in and around the tou.n of Jalce
again demonstrated that the return of refugees to
their oun homes rs one of the most thorny issues.
The series of incidents started u'hen a threatening
croud of Croats besreged the headquarters of the
I-INIPTF of the regron Follou'rng thrs event, a
total number of around 1 000 Muslim refugees
rvere expelled from therr homes to r.r'hich they
had returned one n'eek before in accordance rvith
the Dalton Agreement Both the Unrted Natrons
and SFOR stated that thcy'had information sug-
gestrng that thc local Croat police force had
plal'ed a role rn these events After these inci-
dents. the Croat and Muslim authorities, under
strong rntematronal pressure. signed an agree-
ment to set up a Jolnt pohce force rn the area by
30 August
V. Missing persons
30 Todal' rn Bosnra and Herzegovina some
20 000 rndrvrduals are strll mlssrng They ma1'
have been krlled or assassrnated and therr bodres
burred or incrnerated, but therr famrlies have no
certainty about therr next of kin and often mass
graves have not y'et been opened, or sometimes
only partially, for the exhumation of u'ar vtcttms.
After the conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, it
was realised that the issue of mrssing persons is
one of the stumbling blocks hindering reconcilia-
tion.
31. In the surnmer of 1996, an Internatronal
Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) in for-
mer Yugoslavla !\'as established under the chair-
manship of the former US Secretary of State,
Cyrus Vance The oblective of this Commission
is to assist the families of persons hsted as miss-
ing as a result of the conflict in former Yugosla-
via and to persuade the govemments concerned
to intensifr their efforts to solve cases of missing
persons The Commission is financed by dona-
tions An ICMP offrce under the direction of a
permanently based Chref-of-Staff rvas opened in
Sarajevo in autumn 1996 and the governments of
the region have designated officials as therr rep-
resentatrves to the ICMP
32. At one of the Commission's meetings, the
government representatives presented their vieu's
on how the process of determining the fate of
missing persons could be accelerated The ICMP
has also organised a forum in u'hrch the govern-
ment representatrves and members of misstng
person family associations from all parts of for-
mer Yugoslavia drscuss matters of mutual con-
cem. A famil1'fund alloivs the Commissron to
help the famrhes of missing persons throughout
former Yugoslavra to improve cornmunlcatlon
among themselves by covenng travel costs and
provrdrng facilrtres for meetings. Specific pro-
lects submitted to thc ICMP by rntemational
organisations and NGOs u'orking on the mrsslng
persons issue are being examrned urth a vle\\ to
ralslng funds for such projects.
33 Manl' diffcrent methods are being used rn
thc efforts to rdentrfr exhumed bodres Exhaus-
trve post-mortcm and ante-mortem data are col-
lected and compared and, u'hen necessan'. DNA
technology is used 
- 
both mrtochondrial DNA,
demonstrating a link betrveen mothers and chrld-
ren, and nuclear DNA rvhich can prove a hnk
rvith either parent It should be pointed out,
hou,ever, that even usrng the most advanced
scientrfic methods. relatrvcll ferv exhumed bodrcs
u,rll be identrfied
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34 According to thc ICMP office in Sarajevo,
which your Rapporteur visited in early August
1997, not much progress has been made since
the end of the war on the exhumatron and ex-
change ofbodies.
35 The programme of the Internatronal Com-
mittee of the Red Cross rvas suspended in 1996
and efforts to restart it have not made much
progress. A programme of the office of the High
Representative has been blocked srnce April
1997 and an agreement on continuatron is still a
long rvay off. The International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) has performed around
one thousand exhumations to support evrdence of
war crimes, but financial problems hamper fur-
ther progress.
36. Political power struggles betu'een the trvo
entities of Bosnia and a general lack of coopera-
tion on the part of the political authorities of Re-
publika Srpska in particular are the most obvious
stumbling blocks in the efforts to make real prog-
ress on the issue of missing persons.
37 The ICMP has noted that international
organisations should press local politrcrans to
stop obstructing the identification process and
convlnce local authoritres to support the profes-
sionals committed to carrying out this rvork.
W. lllar criminals
38. When SFOR took over from IFOR. rts
mandate did not rnclude settrng up search parties
to go after indicted rvar cnmrnals. According to
Article IX 9 of Annex l-A to the Dalton Agree-
ment. responsibility for arresting rndrcted u'ar
criminals lics rvith the signaton, partres to that
Agreement SFOR's task u'as to apprehend rn-
drcted u,ar criminals u'hen it ciunc across them rn
the course ofcarrfing out rts dutres
39 This reluctance on the part of the forergn
forces, rvhose main task is to ensure a securc
environment for the further implementatron of the
Dalton Agreement, has understandabli' met xith
increastng cntrcrsm. Many of the indrcted iiar
cnmrnals openlv continuc to u'ield polrtrcal and
economic influence u'ith rmpunity Wrth therr
shameless and rllegal activities. includrng extor-
tion and blackmail, they hamper implemcntation
of the Day'ton Agreement shile denung large
parts of the populatron an1, role ln economic dev-
elopment, u,hich is essential for the reconstruc-
tion of the country
40. After many hesitations and objectrons,
even the members of the Peace Implementation
Council became convinced that a more active
pohcy had to be adopted. In its political declara-
tron of 30 May 1997 at Sintra, it confirmed that
cooperation of all the signatories of the Day,ton
Agreement with the ICTY remained a kel,part of
the peacc implementation process
4l. It expressed particular concern over the
situation rn Republika Srpska, "r.r'here Mr Rado-
van Karadzic continues to influence the political
decision-making of the Entity in vrolation of both
the letter and the spirit of previous undertak-
ings". The declaration noted that persons coop-
erating with, or condoning the role of rndrcted
persons should be denied visas to travel abroad.
It supported the High Representative's recom-
mendatron to deny further economic assislance to
those municipalrties rvhich continued to toleratc
indicted persons u'orking in a public capacity and
sard rt u'ould folloiv this up
42. Finally, it reminded the Federal Repubhc
of Yugoslavra and the Repubhc of Croatia to
honour therr obhgatrons as rcgards rvar cnmi-
nals They u'ere also reminded of their obhgation
to use their closc ties and economic support to
help obtain the surrender of indictees, especially
in Republika Srpska and the predominantly
Croat areas ofthe Federation.
43. By' the end of June 1997, onlr' 8 out of 75
pubhcly' rndlcted uar crimrnals had surrendcred
or been arrestcd Onl1, one guiltv l'erdict had
been given. ri-hile tu,o more tnals had lust
started
44 Soon after thc morc energetrc approach
agreed at Sintra u'as made knoun on 29 June
1997. the rndrcted \\,ar crlmrnal, Slavko Dokma-
novlc, \\'as arrested ln Eastern Slavonra
Mr Dokmanovlc \\'as mayor of the Croatian torrn
of Vukovar in Novembcr I991, uhen thc Yugo-
slav arrn)' troops and Serbran paramrlrtaries al-
legedlv abductcd and krlled 260 personncl and
patients from the local hosprtal A ferv da1's
later, on 10 July', SFOR troops mounted an op-
eratron agarnst other indrcted rvar crimmals in
Prrledor, rn n,hich Mrlan Kovacevlc \\,as arrested
and transferrcd to Thc Hague and Simo Drllaca
u'as killcd u'hen he opencd firc on SFOR sol-
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diers. Mr Drljaca r.r,as forced to step doun as
Prrledor's police chief rn 1996, but he continued
to wield polrtrcal influence He took part in the
black market whrch enables Radovan Karadzic to
finance his unofficial authority'and u'as in charge
of cloaking other indicted u'ar criminals by pro-
vidrng them rvith false documents and safe
houses. Mr Kovacevlc was the political chief of
Prryedor dunng the u'ar and upon his arrest was a
hospital director. Both men u'ere the subject of
sealed indictments issued by the rvar cnmes tri-
bunal and \\'ere accused of participating in geno-
cide. The tnbunal's Chief Prosecutor, Louise
Arbour, recently announced that she planned to
keep rndictments secret in the future to avoid
tipping offsuspects about possible arrests.
45 Polrtical leaders in Repubhka Srpska and
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia rmmediately
protested fiercely over the operation in Pnledor,
which rvas follou-ed b1' bomb and grenade at-
tacks against Western targets in Bosnia and har-
assment of SFOR troops The Russian Forergn
Mrnrster, Yevgeni Pnmakor', cntrcrsed the firmer
attitude SFOR u,as takrng tou'ards Bosruan
Serbs He called rt "counterproductrve" and sard
he u'ould prefer not to see simrlar operattons m
the futurer When rn Sara.;evo on 30 July,
SACEUR Weslel, Clark declarcd that reprisals
by' Bosnian Serbs follorving the more actrve op-
eratlons would not deter SFOR from contmuing
its nerv pohcl'.
46. Notrvithstandrng these operatrons. SFOR
and NATO offrcrals msrsted that the SFOR man-
date had remarncd unchanged Apparently, hou'-
ever, the lnterpretation of the mandate has been
urdened and there ls more nrllingness to exerclse
it fulh' It has been made clear, hou'ever, that rn
u'erghrng future srmrlar operatrons, several rm-
portant factors urll be consrdered, such as thc
probabrlitl' of success rn capturing suspects urth
mrnrmal crvrhan casualtrcs. the possrbrlrtres of
detcrnng Bosnian Serb retahatron and the value
of anl' opcratlon in dcstroy'rng thc pou'er base of
the hard-hne leadershrp rn Pale
41 On l5 Jull', thc ICTY sentenced the
Bosnran Serb rvar crrmrnal Dusan Tadrc to 20
)'ears lmpnsorunent He u,as the second person
to be scntenced for rvar cnmcs and cnmes
agarnst humanrtl' Bosnran Serb authonties
criticised the verdict as unlust and said it proved
an anti-Serb bras on the part ofthe court.
48 After heavl'pressure had been exerted b1'
the United States, ten indicted Bosnian Croat rvar
criminals, includrng Darro Kordic, one of the
most wanted suspects, rvere turned over to thc
ICTY in The Hague on 6 October 1997. The)'
had surrendered in exchange for assurances that
they rvould not have to uart for more than five
months before gorng on trial. Thrs leaves only
one knonn rndicted Croat rvar cnminal, Ivica
Rajic, at large.
49. The few spectacular arrest operations
u'hrch have now taken place since June will have
to be follorved b1' others Norv that the Bosntan
Govemment has rn fact handed over all the pub-
licly indicted Muslims and Croatra has more or
less acted in the same walr, Serbs must realise
that the ICTY rn The Hague ls not an intema-
tional conspiracl' agamst them
50 The Dayton peacc process, rvhrch aims at
a unrfied Bosnran state. has stalled mainly be-
cause of the contrnuous sabotage and opposition
of the Bosnian Serbs, m partrcular Mr Karadzic
and his supporters. The only r.r,ay to make prog-
ress is to remove Mr Karadzrc and his clique if
onll to break therr stranglehold on the economy
of Repubhka Srpska, rvhich is denylng decent
hvrng condrtrons to the malori[, of its inhabi-
tants.
5 1. It has been pornted out repeatedly' by'
Western authontres that arresting Mr Karadzrc rs
an optron, but not necessarrly the only one
There rs also a possrbilitv that he urll be margi-
nahsed bv neu' polrtical developments In par-
trcular. Mrs Plavsrc s emergence as an alterna-
tivc rs seen b1, soms as a more attractrve u,a1' of
removlng Mr Karadzrc from pou'er.
52 On a vrsrt to Sara.;cvo on 30 Jul1 1997. thc
NATO Secrctarl -General. Jauer Solana. de-
clared that all rndrcted u,ar crimrnals rull brought
to The Hague before thc rnternatronal communrtl,
lcavcs Bosnra The onh' conclusron can be the
carher thc bcttcr
WL l-ocal elections
53. The local elcctions u'hrch should have
taken place on 14 Scptcmbcr 1996 havc been
postponcd several trmcs for a number of reasons\ ),-RC-l Ianclelsb latl, I 5 Juh' 1997
i0
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54. In November 1996, the political leaders of
the Croat-Muslim Federation asked the OSCE to
supervise the local elections in 1997 , u,hich at the
time rvere still being rejected by the political
leaders of Republika Srpska Horvever, on I
December, the OSCE amounced that the Presi-
dent of Republika Srpska, Biliana Plavsic, had
formally agreed to local elections, requestrng the
OSCE to prolong its missron in order to super-
vise them.
55. After many' complaints, calls to boycott
the elections, rcquests to postpone them and other
attempts to undermine the process, municipal
elections finally took place on 13 and 14 Sep-
tember 1997 n the whole of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. President Slobodan Milosevic had con-
vinced the SDS leaders of Republika Srpska not
to boycott the electrons, say,ing that ''Nobodv
may meddle u,ith the legitimate right of the crti-
zens to vote for their represeniatives". The
OSCE sent 2 450 observers In order to be able
to ensure maximum securiq,, SFOR rncreased its
strength from 30 000 to 36 000 troops, u,hile the
United States sent six F-16 aircraft to the Itahan
air base at Aviano for reinforced surverllance of
Bosnian territory dunng the elections On the
eve of the elections, NATO's Secretary-General,
Javier Solana, made rt clear that SFOR rvould
"not tolerate anl' violence or threat of violence"
and he warned the medra "u'hose output is in
persrstent and blatant contradrctron of either the
sprnt or the letter of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment"2
56. The OSCE proclarmed the electrons a suc-
cess and a major milestone in the peace process
It recognrsed that there had bccn minor rrregu-
lantres but these had not had a srgnrficant
rnfluence on the overall process It u'as sard that
more than 70o/o of lhe 2.5 mrlhon regrstcred vot-
ers went to the polls
57 Three rveeks after the electrons. the results
of l0 of a total of 136 murucrpalrtres u'ere strll
not knoun The results as kno.wn on 1I October
showed that the three natronahst partres 
- 
SDA
(Muslim), SDS (Serb) and HDZ (Croat) 
- 
strll
have the largest numbcr of votes, but both rn the
Federation and rn Repubhka Srpska their popu-
lanty ts wanlng and there rs a shrft rn favour of a
heterogeneous opposltlon
58 In Banja Luka, the SDS rvon only' 7 of 70
seats, while a number of partrcs u'hrch had
pledged therr support for Mrs Plavsrc u'on 45
seats. In Brcko, the Serbs held the ma.;orrty, in
thc municrpal council but in Srebrenrca, Mushms
u'on 25 seats against 20 for the trvo marn ultra-
nationahst Serb parties. The current mavor of
Srebrenica has re.;ected the results. The mam
problem rvill norv be to implement the results of
the elections, in partrcular in those municipalitres
rvhere the majonty is a result of the votes of
refugees who cast their votes elseu'here. The
OSCE has announced that independently of the
results of the votc rn cach communitl,. a multi-
ethnic adminrstratron u'ill be established rn order
to control the tension that still exists There rvill,
however, be little chance for Mushms to return to
such touns as Srebrenica or for Serbs to return
to Drvar as long as these remaln "occupied" bv
Serb and Croat extremist nationahsts rcspcc-
trvely.
59. Theoreticalh,, much depends on the polrti-
cal u'ill of the foreign countries commrtted to the
peace process and to the electron resuits to rm-
plement the results and use the means at therr
drsposal. It is not qurte clear u'hat thrs u'ould
mean rn practice Thc OSCE can of course tr1,,
n'ith the asslstance of SFOR, to enforce the elec-
tion results rn those municipalrtres u'here the
elected munrcrpal council does not have the same
ethnic composltron as the current inhabitants, but
that u'ould lead to a splcndrdly artrficral srtua-
tion It riill certainlv not lcad to the cstabhsh-
ment of democracr'. rvhrch \\'as one of thc oblcc-
trves of the Darton Agreement.
60 If the neu'lr,-electcd murucrpal councrls are
to make sense, the elcctions u'rll have to bc fol-
lori'ed up bv a massrve return of refugccs and
drsplaced persons to therr pre-\\'ar homcs Thrs
massrve return urll remain a pure rllusron Of
roughlr, 2 I mrlhon Bosnrans forced out of thcrr
homes durrng the *'ar. feu'er than 30 000 havc
returned to them rn areas u'here ther are ln a
minoritl' Onlv sonre 30 000-3,i 000 pcoplc
crosscd thc hnc bctrveen the Serb and Mushm-
Croat parts of Bosnra to vote rn the electtons,
even though thcv ucrc arvarc of the heaw' pro-
tectron pro'r,rded bv SFOR
61. Estabhshrng democracv rnvolr'es a long
leamrng process. In the Balkans. electrons have
long been consrdered as a mcans to lcgrtrmrsc thc2 Atlanttc,\'eu.,s, l7 September 1997
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po\\'er of the rulers. The marn parties in power
at present have a nationalist and ethnic stance
and are in control of the medra, employment,
housing and the economy In the West's vrel,
democratic elections can never lead to the un-
bridled exercise of porver by the \\'rnner. Real
democracy' means bcing elected to exercise power
rvhile allou,ing others to hold that porver rn
check.
62 Democraticalll, elected bodies are sup-
posed to represent and govern the people or the
populatron of the country, region or municipality
u'here thel' have been elected This is by no
mcans the case in many'municipalities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina u'here the composition of the
population before ethnic cleansing lvas the basis
for the electoral lists
63 The ethnic cleansmg that has taken place
rs totally unacceptable to an1' civrhsed socicty,
and there is no rvay' of ever justrfl'rng it. The
ultimate objective of the Dalton Agreement is to
undo the results of ethnrc cleansrng and restore
the multi-ethruc socretl' rvhrch exrsted rn Bosnia
and Herzegovrna before l99l Thrs rs a laudable
ob.lective but rt cannot be attained through the
holding of electrons based on the l99l situation,
rvhich ln man)'cases have led to a total mismatch
betu'een the current local population and their
local rulers Thrs bottom-up approach rs unlikely
to be effcctive What is needed first and
foremost for the rmplementation of the Dayton
Agreement rs the return of refugees This is a
process u'hrch u,rll take man\', manl' 1'ears and
rvrll requrre the prolonged presence of foreign
milrtary and pohce forces u'hich can be the onl1,
guarantee of a retum to a crvrhsed socrety rn
u'hich democratic elections alone. not vrolence,
dctermrne u'ho holds the rerns of porver
WII. International qrbitration over Brcko
64 According to Artrcle V of thc Agreement
on the Inter-Entrty Boundary hnc (Annex 2 to the
Dayton Agrecment), thc Partres agreed to brndrng
arbrtratron of the drsputed portron of the Inter-
Entrtr Boundan, Lrne rn the Brcko area Arbi-
tration ivas to bc the task of one arbitrator ap-
pornted b;" the Fcderation, one appolnted by Re-
pubhka Srpska and one to be selected by agree-
mcnt of the Partres'appointees If the1, could not
agrcc, the third arbrtrator rvould be appointcd by,
the Presrdent of the Intemational Court of Jus-
tice. The proceedrngs rvould be conducted in ac-
cordance with LNCITRAL (Unrted Nattons
Commission on International Trade Law) rules
and the arbitrators were to issue therr decision no
later then one )'ear from the entry rnto force of
the Davton Agreement.
65. At the beginning of December 1996, Re-
pubhka Srpska decided not to partrcipate in the
international arbitration over Brcko. It accused
the Chairman of the Arbrtration Committee,
Robert Ou'en, of not respecting UNCITRAL
rules and of exceedrng the powers of the Arbitra-
tion Committee by proposing to establish an in-
temational adminrstration to govem Brcko.
66. It should be remembered that before its
seizure by the Serbs in Ma7' 1992, Brcko had a
populatron rvhich tt'as 44oh Muslim. 260/o Croal
and 2l% Serb. With its present I00% Serb
population, it is temporanll' ruled under Serb
authority. The Serbs consider it a strategic posr-
tion, contrblling a narrow corridor rvhich links
the eastern and s'estern parts of Republika
Srpska. Its return to Bosnia and Herzegovina
would cut Repubhka Srpska rn ttvo, rvhile
continued Serb rule blocks the Federatron's
access to the Sava nver and the Danube basin
On 14 February 1997, the Internatronal Arbitra-
tron Committee announced rts decrsron to main-
tain the status quo rn Brcko for another year. As
a consequence of this ruling, the toun will re-
marn rn Serb hands and u,ill be admrnistrated by,
the Scrbs for another year under the authority of
an Amcrican supervrsor. in fact providing the
Serbs u'rth an opportunrh' to consohdate their
positron The final decrsron on the status of
Brcko has been postponed untrl l5 March 1998
67 . Meanrvhrle, an international conference on
the implementation of the decrsion of the Arbi-
tration Committee u'as held on 7 i\{arch Ar-
rangements for the return of Mushm and Croat
refugees to Brcko and the cstabhshment of
democratic lnstltutlons \\'ere among the sublects
discussed It was decrded to rncrease the strength
of the rntematronal pohce forcc in that area and
to extend rts field of actron
IX. Financial and economic aid
for reconstruclion
68. The forcign donor countnes and also the
Croats, Muslims and Serbs agree that economrc
t2
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integration and a strengthened relationship with
the intemational business community is the only
possibrlity for lasting peace and development in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Undoubtedly, the
country needs foreign aid for reconstruction, but
this aid can only be effective rf there is an ad-
ministration u'ith enough know-how and a satis-
factory framervork of legislation to guarantee the
smooth running of the state and its economics.
As long as these are lacking because of the reluc-
tance of the different entities to inject energy into
the estabhshment of government machinery
which they were forced to accept under the Day-
ton Agreement, foreign aid can only be moder-
ately effective.
69. The fragile political situation is putting off
foreign private investors for rvhom the alterna-
tives in neighbounng countries in central Europe
are less complicated and more attractive.
70. In April 1997, the Council of the Euro-
pean Union declared that its commercial relations
rvrth Albanra, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
FYROM rvere sublect to certain condrtrons. It
stated that bilateral relatrons, the granting of
commercial preference and exchanges, economic
cooperation and financial aid rvould only be pos-
sible with countries respecting democratic prin-
ciples and the rule of law, human rights and the
rights of minontres, the principles of a market
economy and regronal cooperation.
71. The lack of rnternal agreement in Bosnia
and Herzegovina has caused the repeated post-
ponement of the international donor conference
The United States insrsted on postponement untrl
the Serbs agreed on legislation rvhrch would fac-
rlitate rnvestments ln the country This legrslation
was to comprise lau's on the payment of foreign
debt, the creatlon of a central bank, a common
currency, customs arrangements and a privatr-
satron programme' Europeans rvanted thrs con-
ference to take place on the condrtron that aid to
Republika Srpska u,ould be blocked until thev
agreed to the nerv legislatron
72. The central Bosnran Government an-
nounced on 15 Apnl that it had agreed to estab-
lish a central bank and a common currency. No
sooner rvas this agreement concluded than the
Bosnian Serbs rvithdrer.v their approval, bringing
everything back to square one. In June, the par-
liament passed laws to create a central bank and
a corrrmon currency (see paragraph l7) but their
implementation appears to be causing problcms.
73. Finally,, the rntcrnatronal donor conference
on Bosnia took place on23-24 July 1997, under
the auspices of the European Union and the
World Bank, rvrth 30 organisations participatrng.
The participants pledged a total of $1.22 billion
in aid to support mdustry, repair the infrastruc-
ture and get the local economy moving. The con-
ference chairman, Hans van den Broek, said that
aid could not be justified to parties rvho "oppose
and frustrate" the goal of post-war reconstruction
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He added that hu-
manitarian assistance to Republika Srpska rvould
be continued, but that the overall political and
economic influence of indicted war crimmals in
the republic "rs such that it would be rrres-
ponsible to contmue spendrng public funds for
reconstruction purposes'*
74 The conference rssued a declaration m
u'hrch rt denounced the critical situation in Re-
publika Srpska, notrng the anti-democratic cli-
mate, terrorist actions and violations of the auth-
ority of the police. The granting of non-human-
ltanan ard rn'as not excluded, but as long as the
Republic drd not meet its obhgations under the
Dayton Agreement. it rvould only, concern ard
rvhich would promote its integration into Bosnia
and Herzegovina ruthout ending up in the pock-
ets of indicted rvar cnminals.
7 5 . It should be pointed out, hou'ever, that this
denial of reconstructlon ard rvrll have lrttle or no
effect on the final oblectrve 
- 
to terminate the
polrtical and economrc rnfluence of rndicted u'ar
cnminals and make the Republic meet its Dalton
obligatrons 
- 
unless thc populatron rs given the
rnformatron n'hrch uould help it understand the
reasons and unless the rvar criminals are arrested
or othenvrse ehmrnated from the polrtrcal and
economic scene Pressure to implement Dayton
uill onlv have effect rf it rs accompanied by
abolition of the rnformatron monopoly of the
SDS in all parts of Repubhka Srpska while. at
the same trme. promoting rndependent media and
not replacmg one monopoly,by another one
76 In 1997. the Unrted States blocked tu,o
World Bank and Intemational Monetan, Fund
l3
' Le Ftgoro.l2 Ma1, 1997 't Th" lnlernottonal Heralcl Trtbune,24 ltiy 1991
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loans to Croatia and threatened rt with diplomatic
isolation rf it did not comply rvrth the obligations
of the Dayton Agreement
77 . Fortunatell,, there are still many successful
smaller-scale reconstructton programmes. Your
Rapporteur rvas able to visit the Hrasno district
in Sarajevo rvhere, after the end of hostilitres,
only 2 200 apartments out of a total of 3 705
were still habrtable. A project has norv been es-
tablished at the uritiative of the city of Amster-
dam to reconstruct the district and rehabilitate
the apartments rvith financial contributions from
the city of Amsterdam, the citl' of Bradford, the
Netherlands Government, the European Com-
mission and private companies and individuals.
A feu' apartment blocks have already been re-
habilitated and further u'ork is still in progress
X. The llEU police task force in Mostar
78. In Jull' 1994, the European Union took on
the responsibrlity of administering Mostar with
the objective of reunrfuing the town and making
the Croat and Muslim communittes live together
In that frameu'ork, the European Union asked
WEU to deploy' a European police task force
whrch u'as to help transform the separate Croat
and Muslim pohce forces into a common struc-
ture.
79. Since Jull' 1994, this WEU police force,
u'hrch consisted of 182 pohcemen from ten WEU
countries as u'ell as from Su'eden and Austria,
has helped to promote comprehension and coop-
eratron betrveen the Croat and Muslim popula-
tron and has trarned 380 local police officers.
80 The European Unron's administration of
Mostar ended rn Julv 1996 s'hen authority over
the citl's'as transferred to a Croat mayor and a
Mushm deputl' According to a decisron of the
WEU Councrl of 8 October 1996, authority for
the pohce rn Mostar u'as transferred to the
Minrster of the Interror of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovrna on l5 October 1996
8 t In February' 1997 , Croats opened fire on a
group of Mushms u'ho u'ere attempting to travel
through the Croat-controlled part of Mostar rn
order to vrsit a Muslim gravelard One Muslim
u'as killed and some 20 to 30 people wounded
Follourng thrs incident. a number of Muslim
famrhes r.r-ere expelled from the Croat-controllcd
part of the crtv As a result of these violcnt inci-
dents. several hundred French and Spanish
troops were mobilised in order to prevent further
clashes betrveen Croats and Muslims. It also led
to the collapse of the joint Croat-Mushm pohce
force in the city, uith each side withdrawing rts
officers to its orvn part Later, the Croat police
chref of west Mostar was suspended from dutl'
for obstructmg an mvestigation into the incident,
rvhile three Croat pohce officers were gil'en sus-
pended sentences for allegedly shootrng into the
unarmed Mushm crou-d. The joint Croat-Mushm
police force has in the meantime been reestab-
Iished through mediation b1' the United Nations
International Police Task Force.
XI. Public security and the task
of the United Nations International Police
Tosk Force (Pff)
82. Democratic and restructured police forces
are essential for the Dayton peace process to
succeed In rts Sintra polrtical declaration of 30
May 1997, the Steering Board of the Peace Im-
plementation Council therefore expected both
Republika Srpska and the Federation to acceler-
ate the process of restructunng their police forces
in line with the princrples and plans prepared
under the guidance of the IPTF. It stated that
Repubhka Srpska. rn particular, \\'as behrnd in
its commitments to restructuring. The Steering
Board also expected the relevant authorities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina to take further measures
to provide the necessary control and securitl'.
based on democratic procedures, to address
smuggling, terrorrsm and cnme along lts interna-
tronal borders.
83 In order to rmprove thc investrgailon of
human rights vrolations. thc UN Securrtv Councrl
has authorrsed thc dcployment of an addrtronal
120 monrtors The Steerrng Board has cncour-
aged the IPTF to deplov these monrtors to rdcn-
trS' rndrvrdual vrolators. particularll' members of
police forces, and to recommend approprratc
action
84 In the precedrng Defence Committee report
on Bosnia and Hcrzcgovrna (Assembll' Docu-
ment l54l), there uas cntictsm of the shortcom-
ings u'hrch prevented the IPTF from effectrvely
performing its tasks Nou', one 1'ear later. con-
srderable progress has bcen made. The IPTF is
bcttcr equrpped and the IPTF Commissioncr
l4
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confirms that it has all the communications and
transport means it needs. Of the maximum
agreed number of 2 027 staff members, almost
2 000 are norv deployed. The quality of the
IPTF's human resources has improvcd consi-
derably and new candidates are being tested as to
their suitability, if possible rn their own coun-
tnes, before being sent to Bosnia and Herze-
govina. The IPTF staff is divided into four main
categories: monitors, trainers (t 200), investi-
gators of human rights violations (* 200) and
managers on all diflerent levels.
85. The IPTF stresses that the implementation
of its mandate to help the country build a fully
integrated, well organised, modem police force
able to cope with all the police tasks in a demo-
cratic state will take time. The IPTF Commis-
sioner clearly indicated to your Rapporteur that
the IPTF cannot fulfil its present mandate with-
out the cooperation and occasional support of
SFOR or a similar multinational armed force. A
show of force is occasionally inevitable, but this
should preferably come from SFOR because the
IPTF can onlf implement its basrc task if it man-
ages to establish a relationship based on trust
that will enable it to help the national and local
police adopt a nerv attitude.
86 The IPTF is fairly satisfied rvith the prog-
ress made in implementation of its mandate in the
Federation of Bosnra and Herzegovma In both
Mostar and Saralevo, Croat and Mushm police
offrcers are now fully integrated. Elseu'here, this
integration process is under rva1,. The cantonal
police, rvhich also includes border police, is norv
also being integrated, wit}r an ethnrc mix based
on the results of the 1991 census The customs
servrce of the European Union is monitoring the
organrsation of the Bosnian customs servrce in
coordrnation rvrth the IPTF.
87. The response by police forces in Repub-
lika Srpska rs sard to be non-existent. They are
used by politrcal leaders to enforce and mamtarn
their political and economic porver and have bcen
given clear orders not to. cooperate u'rth the
IPTF. The nerv SFOR pohcl' for the control and
restructuring of the Specrahst Police Forces,
rvhrch \\'as announced on 8 August last (see
paragraphsl l8-123) may, in time, lead to a more
cooperatlve attitude on the part ofthesc and other
pohce forces in Republika Srpska
88. There can be little doubt that the IPTF's
work to help re-establish the rule of lau', includ-
ing democraticalll,-s6n1..lled police forces. will
still take man),years. In its present composition,
it cannot implement its mandate rvithout support
from SFOR or its possrble successor force. A
reduced presence of forergn mrlitary forces rn
Bosnia and Herzegovina after June 1998 could
seriously hamper implementatron of the IPTF
mandate. It has therefore been suggested that the
IPTF be strengthened bv greater European in-
volvement through the deplolment of a substan-
tialWEU police force.
XII. Arms control ond rearmament 
-
the equip and train programme
89. On 14 June 1996, the representatives of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the two
Bosruan enhtres 
- 
the Federation of Bosrua and
Herzegovr:ra and the Serb Republic 
- 
sigrred an
agreement on sub-regional arms control wluch rvas
negotiated under the auspices of the OSCE n
Vrenna. The agreement rncluded lurutations for all
parties in the follorving categones of heavy arma-
ments: battle tanks, armourcd combat velucles, artil-
lery over 75 mm. combat arcraft and attack heli-
copters. For each of the parties, ceilrrgs were set at
the lorvest possible level, follou,rng the model of the
Treaty on the reduction of Convenuonal Forces ur
Europe (CFE).
90 According to this Agreement, the follou'-
ing arms ceilings are in force'
Tanks .Armoured
combat
velucles
Artrl-
lerl
Planes Heh-
copters
FRY I 025 850 3'750 155 53
Croatia 410 340 I 500 62 2l
Bosrua 410 340 I 500 62 IL
Serb. Rep 137 I l3 500 2t 7
Federatron 273 22'l I 000 4l l4
91. The Agreemcnt strpulated that starturg from
I July 1996, the parties had 16 months rn wtuch to
reduce the number of lveapons thel' held to specific
levels. Excess \\'eapons could bc exported, des-
troyed, or put on fixcd pubhc displav Excess com-
l,s
s Source: Atlanttc.\rev,s, I I Junc 1996
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bat aircraft could be used for training if they rvere
stnpped of armaments
92. In its declaration of 30 Mar, 1997 in
Sintra, the Steering Board of the Peace Imple-
mentation Council noted that the Entities still had
a long rvay to go to comply rvith the Agreement.
It was greatly concerned b1' the failure of
Republika Srpska to implement its commitments
to reduction in full, as well as b1'the failure of
the Federation to produce the required plan for
this purpose.
93. It seems, hou'ever, that major progress has
recentll' been made in the rmplementatron of the
arms control Agreement. According to data from
the OSCE, a total of 4 220 items in the equip-
ment categories mentioned in the Agreement have
now been demolished by the four srgnatories.
OSCE authorities have been quoted as sal,ing
that the organisation ri'as satisfied that all parties
had provided reasonably accurate reports on their
holdings and they expected that both entities of
Bosnra and Herzegovrna rvould meet the official
deadline for the demolition of equipment6.
94. Horvever, as rvas mentioned in the Com-
mittee's 1996 report on Bosnra and Herzegovina
(Assembly Document l54l), the United States
took the rnitiative of equipprng and trainrng the
armed forces of the Mushm-Croat Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina The objective of the
programme rvas to brrng the Federation's arsenal
up to the same level as that of Republika Srpska
A secondary ob.yective u'as to drminrsh the influ-
ence of Iran on Bosnra's armv and securrtl, serv-
ices, u,hich resulted from the presence of several
hundred mulaheddin fighters and the provrsion of
Iranian militarl,aid durrng the conflrct in former
Yugoslavra
95 It ri'ill be rcmembcred that the Unrtcd
States had sct certarn condrtions for the imple-
mentatlon of the equrp and tratn programme.
The most rmportant condrtron- the merger of the
Croat and Mushm armed forces of the Federa-
tton. is norv graduallv berng met In earlv 1997.
thc Muslim and Croat Presrdents Izetbegovrc and
Zubah agreed on the structure of the nerv federal
army and its joint command. Thrs u'as follos'ed
by'the adoptron b1,the Croat and Muslim Mrnrs-
tcr and Dcputl, Minister for Defcnce on 4 Febru-
an'of the structure of the federal Defence Minrs-
try'. Both decisions have now been implemented.
Since December 1996 a federal army academ,v
has been operational. There are, holever, con-
trnuing differences betrveen Croats and Muslims
over the composition of their respective forces
and the ratios for joint units. The United States
has suggested observrng a ratlo of l0 Bosnians to
4 Croats in the army,. For joint units and for the
Ministry of Defence and the Joint Operatrons
Command, they suggested a 70:30 ratio. An-
other condifion, the resignation of the Muslim
Deputy Minister for Defence, Hasan Gencic,
rvhom the Americans accused of berng too close
to Iran has also been met
96. In the framework of the equip and train
prograrnme, the follorving equipment rr'as do-
nated to the Federation
(a) United States' donations:
I 000 M60 machine guns u'ith arrrmun-
ition;
- 
46 100 Ml6,{l rifles rvith ammunitron;
45 M60A3 marn battle tanks rncludrng
refurbishment, machine guns and am-
munition;
80 Mll3A2 armoured personnel car-
ricrs rncludrng machine guns and am-
munition;
I5 UH-lH helicopters;
840 AT-4 light anti-tank \\'eapons;
I l6 (Ml 14) I55 mm hou'itzers.
- 
5l D-30 122 mm hou'rtzers. to be man-
ufactured rn Bosnia.
- 
400 trucks including tank transporters,
a large number of handheld and man-
pack radros. tactical telephones and
othcr mrnor cqurpment
(b) United Arab Emirates' donation
- 
36 (M56) I05 mm ho$'rtzers. arrrmun-
itron and spare parts
k) Egvptian donatrons.
- 
l2 (M59) 130 mm field guns:
l2 D-30 122 mnt horvrtzers.
- 
18 ZU23 23 mm anti-aircraft guns u'ith
sparc parts and ammunrtron6 Internalronal lJerald Trtbune.25-26 October 199'7
l6
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97. The Federation is also being equipped rvrth
a combat simulatron centre and the Multiple In-
tegrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) II,
providing a computer-generated battlefield for
brigade and battahon-level srmulated exercises.
The United States has pointed out that the
equipment provrded falls withrn the limrts of the
14 June 1996 agreement on sub-regional arms
control, u'hich u'as based on Article IV of the
Dayton Agreement
98. A full strength army of the Federation will
consist of four corps rvith 14 manoeuvre brigades
and a "Federation reaction brigade" composed of
one Mushm and one Croat combrned-arms bat-
talion. The Federation will have a total of
30 000-35 000 professionals The current train-
ing programme is being implemented by a United
States civrlian contractor rvith I85 ex-military
US personnel in BosniaT.
99. On the occasion of the visit of a US
delegatron to Banja Luka on 6 September 1997,
President Brl;ana Plavsrc expressed the oprnron
that NATO should help the army of Repubhka
Srpska to equip itself in the same rvay as the
Croat-Muslim Federation, arguing that all the
legal mrlitary' structures in Bosnra and Herze-
govma should be treated rn the same rvay b1, the
international communitl,. Such an assrstance pro-
grarrrme, she sard, rvould be a "real guarantee of
peace" and it u,ould strengthen the Serb popul-
ation's confidence rn NATO forces in Bosnia
100 Earher. the American representatrve for
military stabrlisatron rn the Balkans, James
Pardeu'. had declared that the equip and tram
prograrnme could be extended to Repubhka
Srpska on thc sole condrtron that its lcaders apply
the Dalton Agreement to the letters
l0l Strrctll' speakrng, the armed forces ratro
bets'een the Federation and Republika Slpska rs
2 l. but the Unrted States argucs that rn a thco-
retrcal conflrct betu'een the tu'o parts, Repubhka
Srpska u'ould strll have superionty because rt
rvould be able to rely upon the armed forces of
the Federal Repubhc of Yugoslavia.
' Jane's ]nte rnattonal Defence Revtew, August
1997. page 58 ff.
E 
,4tlanttc 
-\'erys, l0 Scptember 1997.
I02. As it is, Republika Srpska is u,orried
about the militarl, burld-up in the Federation,
especrally sincc its olvn military forces have been
imploding as a result of the porver struggle gorng
on betrveen polrtical adversaries in Banja Luka
and Palc, lvhile at the same time the1, are de-
moralised, inadequately' trarned and are suffering
from a lack of funds and training, a severe short-
age ofspare parts and hrgh desertion ratcs
103. The former UN High Representative, Carl
Bildt, recently pointed out that the present trends
in training and equipment acquisition are leading
to a situation in whrch the Serbs will be
"significantll, outgunned". This is not only
caused by the abovementioned 2:l ratio in troops
and heary weaponn/, but also b1'the qualrtative
edge, r,r'hrch he callcd the most important effect
of the equip and train programme He countcrcd
the argument of support for Republika Srpska
from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia arguing
that, based on therr track record of recent 1,ears,
the armed forces of Croatra were more hkelv and
wilhng to march rnto Bosnra than the Yugoslav
mrlitary.
104. Mr Bildt's conccm 
- 
shared b1'the World
Bank 
- 
was, how'ever, that current increased
milrtary spending u'as far in excess of what u'as
needed to foster an atmosphere of securrtl,. In
particular, he clarmcd it was impedrng crvrhan
reconstruction, economic grouth and povert.v
reductione.
105. Senior NATO offrcials have contended
that apart from the cqurp and tram programme,
the Muslim-led part of the Federatron is rntensi-
$,ing a clandcstrne prograrTrmc to arm and trarn
rts forces lvhrch urll enable them to mount a
crushing offensrve against Repubhka Srpska It
u'as noted that an Egrptran frerghter sarhng un-
der the (lliramran flag and carrymg ten T55 tanks
rvhrch rvere to be dchvcred as part of a secrct
shrpment to the Muslims, n'as quarantined undcr
NATO guard off the Croatran port of Ploce
Weapons have also arnved rn thc Croatran port
of Rijeka u'hich rs not guarded b1' NATO Offi-
cials also mentioncd that a general at thc Iranran
embassy is rvorkrng out dcals urth the Croats to
smuggle more \\'eapons through Croatia to the
Bosnian Muslims The exrstence of a secret ac-
l1
' De|ense Arerus, 1-7 Scptembcr 1997
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quisitlon and training prograrrrme rn parallel rtrth
the offrcial equip and train programme has bcen
formally denied by Mushm governmcnt officrals
m Sarajevoro
XIII. SFOR (Stahilisotion Force)
106 The grorvrng consensus over the necd for a
successor force to IFOR rvas described tn outlme
in Chaptcr XII of the previous reportrr This
consensus becamc even stronger rvhen the head
of the OSCE electoral mrssion, Robert Frowrck,
announced on 22 October 1996 that thc munici-
pal elections in Bosnia and Herzegovrna, sched-
uled for November after having been postponed
several times, s'ere postponed untrl sprrng 1997
Among the reasons for this fresh delay rvere the
irregulanties noted durrng enrolment on electoral
lists, and the lack of freedom of movement *'hrch
rvas closely, connected rvrth the actrvrties of
nationalist leaders to promote separatlon
107 On 7 November 1996. Gencral Wilham
Crouch, head of the Allied Land Forces Central
Europe (AFCENT) took over the command of
IFOR Elements from headquarters LANDCENT
u'ere deplol'ed to form the nucleus of a nerl
headquarters for the command and control of
IFOR. Although the main missron of the nerv
headquarters \\-as to assume responsrbrlrtl' for
organlsrng the IFOR lvrthdrau'al, lt $'as no secret
that it mrght also become the headquarters of the
IFOR successor force
I08 Later. on 27 November. the NATO Per-
manent Councrl agreed on most of the polrtrcal
directrves for thc mihtan' authoritres to plan for
an IFOR successor force, named SFOR After
havrng replaced IFOR on 20 Decembcr, SFOR
\\'as. rn prrncrple, to sta)' for a perrod of l8
months untrl 20 Junc 1998 It u'as also agrced.
in pnncrple. that the rnrtral contrngcnt of 31 000
troops u'ould be reduced as soon as possrble,
depcnding on the clrcumstances. and that the de-
finrtrve duratron of rts mandatc uould depend
upon revlcws of the sltuatron after srx and tu,elve
months of rts mrssron
" Th" lnternottrtnal Herald
t991
1' Asscmblv Document l5.ll.
Bosnto and Herzegovtno
Trtbune. -1-5 Octobcr
Tha role of Europe tn
109 SFOR rvas to provtde assrstance in the
municrpal elections planned for the summer of
1997 and the possibility' of sendrng more troops
during the election penod rvas kept open Lrke
IFOR, SFOR \\'as not to perform anv policc
tasks and, as a conscquence, lt was not to pursue
lvar cnminals rndrcted by'the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Former Yugoslaua (ICTY)
SACEUR cmphasrsed that SFOR u'ould con-
centrate on the marn military tasks and provrde a
safe, secure environment and that rt ri'ould have
the same rules of engagement
I 10. After the adoption of UN Secunty' Council
Resolution 1088, u'hrch gave NATO a mandate
to carry out operation Jornt Guard on the basrs of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, NATO's Def-
ence Ministers approved the operational plans for
SFOR on 17 Dccember 1996. SFOR became
operatronal on 20 December, havrng taken ovcr
from IFOR.
1l L Operatron Jornt Guard, as rmplemented by
SFOR, was to have four phases,
I: transrtron a perrod from 20 Deccm-
ber 1996 to 3 February' 1997, to fulli,
dcplol' SFOR ivith 32 particrpatrng
countrles,
- 
II stabrhsatron. from February to June
1997. thc arm berng to prevent further
hostilities untrl after the munrcipal
electrons planned for June 1997 
- 
thrs
u'as SFOR's mam task,
III deterrencc from June 1997 to
sprrng 1998. durrng u'hrch time SFOR,
rvith a reduced strength u'ould strll havc
to dissuade partles from startrng a fresh
conflrct,
IV cnd of mrssron. n'rth thc complcte
rvrthdraual of forces at thc cnd of June
I 998
ll2 In spnng 1997. soon after the fulI deplor'-
ment of SFOR. rt bccame rncreasrnglv clcar that
the implcmentatron proccss of the Darton
Agreement had comc to an almost complete
standstill rn man\ respccts Both thc NATO
Council and the Stccrrng Board of the Peacc Im-
plementatron Councrl, mcctlng rn Ma1' I997. de-
crded to take dccrsrve actron as erplarned in
Chaptcr II of the present report. Inevrtablr'. thrs
l8
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approach would onl1, be effective if accompanied
by a more assertivc stance on the part of SFOR
r,r,hich was reinforced for this purpose.
I l3 In preparation for the municrpal elections
in Bosnra and Herzegovina, SACEUR called for
a temporary remforcement of SFOR lvith six
battalions from 20 August to 20 October in order
to guarantee an envlronment of sccurity and
provide logistics and communicatrons support
which u,as accordingly authonsed The NATO
Council discussed the first six months' revierv of
the SFOR mrssron on 27 June in consultation
rvith the 20 non-NATO countries contributing to
SFOR
I14. A statement on the six-month revien' noted
in partrcular the folloriing
"The revierv confirmed that SFOR is
accomplishing its mrssion successfully,
enforcing military compliance. firmly
but fairly, contributing to the securc
environment for the overall im-
plementation of the Peace Agrecment
and providing srgnificant support to the
organisations rcsponsible for imple-
menting its civil aspects "
"While the Parties remarn rn general
compliant rvith the mllrtary provisrons
of the Peace Agreemcnt. therc are still
serrous concems about the deficrencres
remarning rn the overall implcmentation
of the Peace Agreement NATO and
non-NATO contributors to SFOR as-
sociate themselves fulli, ri'rth the dec-
laration folloxrng the mrnisterral meet-
rng of the Stcenng Board of the Peace
Implementatron Council in Srntra on 20
Mar'. calling on all the Partres to rm-
plement it fullv and u'rthout delal'"
- 
''Wrth the exceptron of thrs force ad-
.;ustment [for the munrcrpal electionsl.
no other srgnificant changcs to the size
and capabrlrties of SFOR rvrll take
placc untrl the NAC. rn consultation
uith the non-NATO-SFOR contrr-
butors. has undertakcn a thorough
assessment of the secunty situation rn
Bosnra and Herzegovina after the
electrons "
I l5 When. on l0 July' 1997, SFOR took steps
to detain t$'o persons rndicted for s,ar crrmcs at
Prrlrdor, both the Secretary-General of NATO
and SACEUR emphasised that this opcration
was not the result of a change of policy or a
change of SFOR's mission The actron rvas
"undcrtaken under SFOR's mandate rvhich
authoriscs it to detain war crimmals rvhen en-
countered rn the course of rts duties." They re-
called that accordrng to the Day,ton Agreement. rt
was up to the three parties in Bosnra to go after
the suspects.
I 16. At its mcctrng at the end of July', the Per-
manent NATO Council called on its military
authorities to studl'scveral options for transition
from Phase II (stabihsatron) to Phase III
(deterrcnce), rvhich in the original plan entarled a
considerable reductron m troop numbers 
- 
from
30 000 to less than 20 000 At the same time,
the Secretary-General of NATO, the SFOR
Commander and a number of Western govern-
ments rssued firm rvarnings to politrcal leaders in
Republika Srpska that morc terronst attacks
against SFOR and other rnternatronal personnel
in the Rcpublic could lead to punitive action.
ll7. During August and September, SFOR had
to mtervene repeatedly with a shorv of forcc in
clashes rvhich u'ere the consequcnce of a porver
struggle betrveen supportcrs of Mrs Plavsrc and
Mr Karadzrc.
I18. Follorvlng acts of violence against ele-
ments of the IIN International Pohce Force and
SFOR troops in Brcko, the NATO Pcrmanent
Councrl, meeting in special session on 30 August
1997, adopted a statcment "condemnng rccent
vtolence and confirmrng that SFOR u'rll continue
to carn'out rts missron firml1'but farrlv and rvrll
not tolcrate the use of forcc or rntrmrdation''
The statement continues "The Councrl re-
spondcd positivelv to a rcqucst b1 the High Rep-
resentatlve to authonsc SFOR to provrde the
necessar!' support to suspend or curtarl any'
media netu'ork or programmc ln Bosnia and
Herzegovrna rvhose output is rn persistent and
blatant contradrctron of either thc sprnt or the
letter of the Pcacc Agreement. ln accordance u'rth
the Sintra Declaratlon " The statement adds that
"rn addition. the Council reaffrrmcd that SFOR
u,ill not hesitate to take thc neccssan' mcasures
including the use of forcc agarnst medra rncrtrng
attacks on SFOR or other intcrnatronal organisa-
tlons. "
l9
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I19. SACEUR General Wesley Clark later
stated: "We q,ill use all means including lethal
means to protect our forces and continue our
rrl 2mlsslon"''. Ihese nerv rules of engagement gave
SFOR more muscle at a crucial juncture in rts
mission, but it should be noted that it also in-
creased the risks of it becoming rnvolved in l'io-
lent clashes rvith extremist nationalists.
120. The second area in u'hich SFOR recentl.v
has recently taken a firmer line concems the
Specralist Police Forces which are heavily armed
and exist in large numbers in Republika Srpska.
On 8 August, SFOR Commander General Eric
Shinseki announced a ne\\'policl,for the control
and restructuring of the Specialist Police Forces
of the entities, with the objective of assisting,
accelerating and ensuring police restructuring
and reform. These police forces rvill now be
brought into line rvith the police forces standard
recognised by most democratic nations
l2l. The Specialist Police Forces, whrch have
not been duly certified by the UNIPTF, will be-
come sublect to the provrsions of Annex lA to
the Dayton Agreement 
- 
the Agreement on Mili-
tary Aspects of the Peace Settlement. Those
Specialist Pohce Forces that are undergoing cer-
tification rvill remain under the IPTF unless they,
fall behind in their restructuring prograrnme
Specralist Police Forces subject to the provisrons
of Annex lA will be grven the same treatment as
applies to the Entity Militan,Forces
122. Among many other thrngs, Artrcle IV.6 of
Annex lA gives SFOR the right "to compel the
removal, urthdralval or relocation of Specific
Forces and rveapons from. and to order the ces-
satron of an1' activities in, anv location in Bosnia
and Herzegovina u'henever [SFOR] determrnes
such forces, rveapons or actrvrtres to constltute a
threat or potentral threat to erther the ISFOR] or
its missron or to another par[' Forces farhng to
redeploy, rvithdraw, relocate or cgase threatenrng
or potentially threatening actrvrtres follou'rng
such a demand by the [SFOR] shall be subject to
milrtary actron by the [SFOR]. rncludrng the usc
of necessan' force to ensure comphance, consls-
tent u'rth the terms set forth rn Artrcle I, para-
graph 3 "
123 SFOR made it clear that the Presidents of
the Entitres and the Prcsrdcno, of Bosnia and
Herzegovina had been given formal notification
of nerv "Instructions for Specialist Police" and of
the requirement that they restructure those forces
m accordance rvith principles and plans prepared
under SFOR and IPTF guidance. It further noted
that these letters of notification reinforced therr
obligatron to provide a safe and secure environ-
ment for all pcrsons under therr lurisdiction b1'
operating civilian larv-enforcement agencies rn
accordance with internationally recognrsed stan-
dards.
124. The Specialist Police Forces are in fact
pnvate armies belongrng to the various factions
In Repubhka Srpska they have often been rn-
strumental in enforcing the policy of the SDS
polrtrcal leaders, rvhile they have also plal'ed a
role in the protectron of indicted rvar cnminals,
such as Radovan Karadzic, who are still at large.
125. SACEUR General Weslel' Clark recently
told the Permanent NATO Council that SFOR is
actively rvatching the Specialist Pohce Forces.
u'hich are heavily armed and exist rn large num-
bers m Repubhka Srpska. When mectrng therr
leader, General Clark clearly told him that. ac-
cording to the terms of the Darton Agreement,
these forces are illegal and must be drsmantledr3.
126 At an informal mecting of NATO's Def-
ence Mrnisters in Maastricht on I and 2 October
1997, no formal decisions rvere taken on SFOR,
but consensus \\'as reached in favour of an on-
going SFOR presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina
at its current strength of 36 000 troops over the
coming months, rvith the possrbrlin' of a small
reductron of 4 000 to 5 000 troops at the end of
1997 It u'as noted that not a single minister u'as
in favour of a transition to Phase III (deterrence)
rvrth a consrderabh' reduced number of troops
(lcss than 20 000), u'hrch rn December I996 had
been scheduled for June 1997. A neu'element
uhrch had to be taken into consrderatron rvas the
rncreased tension rn Repubhka Srpska (sce Chap-
ter XV), n,here parhamentary clcctrons and neu'
electrons for the President of thc Republic ma1'
take place latcr thrs )'ear or in 1998
127 Gencral Naumann, Chairman of NATO's
Mrlrtary Commrttee. pornted out that SFOR
should not be grven pohce tasks. rvhrch are the
t2 Atlanttc ]'erys, 5 September 1997
20
t1 Atlanttc A'ews, l0 Septcmber 1997
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strict responsibility of the three Bosnian entrties
and the civil authorities. At the same time, min-
isters thought that as SFOR is currently at its
maximum strength, this situation must be used to
support the pro-Dayton forces and make maxi-
mum progress in stabilising Bosnia and Herze-
govina.
XIV Post-SFOR
128. In spring 1997, the Clinton Administra-
tion, acknowledging that the Dayton peace proc-
ess was in danger, started to advocate and take
more aggressive steps to make parties meet their
obligations. The President had pledged that
United States ground forces would leave Bosnia
and Herzegovina at the end of the SFOR man-
date in June 1998. He realised full well that
wrthout the presence of forergn military forces,
progress in the implementatron of the Day'ton
Agreement would be almost non-existent. Both
the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and
the craftsman of the Dayton Agreement, Rrchard
Holbrooke, were sent to the region in order to
give fresh impetus to the peace process.
129. SFOR was instructed to become more ac-
tively engaged rvhile, at the same time, it was
reinforced rvith extra troops. It very soon be-
came clear, however, that even this more active
foreign involvement in getting the Dalton
Agreement implemented u,ould never result in a
situation u'hich rvould allorv foreign troops to
leave Bosrua and Herzegovina by June 1998
rvithout an,v risk of a resumption of hostilities
behveen the parties.
I30. In recent meetings rvith NATO in Brus-
sels, both the UN High Representative, Carlos
Westendorp, and the Head of the OSCE Mlssron,
Robert Frou'ick, stressed the need for a long-term
rnternational commitment u'hile pointing out that
substantial progress had already been made rn
implementing the Dayton Agreement. Mr
Frorvrck even made it clear that rt u'as absolutely
esscntral for the intemational communitl, to rc-
mam in Bosnia for an unspecified length of timc,
rncluding a "signrficant and credible commit-
ment, especially bi'the United States"r4.
l3 l. Although for somc time, the United States
Government has tncd to maintain the impression
that it is determined to rvithdraw its ground
troops from Bosnra and Herzegovina in June
1998, a reconsideration of this objective is ap-
parently taking place in the light of developments
in that country and in NATO.
132. The shift in opinion is clearll' apparent in
the attitude of the US Congress In June 1997,
thc Housc of Representatives adopted an
amendment to cut off funds for United States
peacekeeping troops in Bosnia after June 1998.
Members of the House said that this deadline
provision should serve notice on European allies
to be prepared to take on greater responsibility in
Bosnia by that timers. In a July vote on this
subject. the Senate strongly urged, but did not
require, the Unrted States to pull its troops out of
Bosnia by' next June, providing the Administra-
tion with more flexibility. On 24 September, the
Congress \\,as even more accommodating by,
authorising President Clinton to maintain troops
in Bosnip beyond the end of the SFOR mandate
in June 1998 via a draft bill rvhich rvould enable
SFOR to pursue rts mission if that were "rn line
rvith the secunt)' interests of the Uruted States"'6.
133. In Septembe r 1997, several United States
authorities started to prepare the public for a
contrnuation of close US rnvoh'ement in Bosnia,
Sandy Berger, Presrdent Chnton's National Sec-
urrty Adviser, crrticised those politicrans and
analysts who had argued rn favour of giving up
the peace process under the Darton Agreement.
Admitting that progress rn the Day,ton peace
process u'as painfully slou', he said there lvas
nevertheless posrtive change and that the condi-
tions were berng created for a lasting peace. He
added that a failed Dalton rvould almost cer-
tarnly result in a nerv conflrct s'hrch could extend
into south-eastern Europe Thrs u,ould under-
mine NATO's credibrlity' at a cntrcal moment
The Unrted States, he concluded. had an impor-
tant interest rn the establishment of a lastrng
peace in Bosnral'.
134. In Maastricht on I and 2 October, the US
Defencc Secrctan'. Wrlham Cohen, emphasrsed
the need to keep to deadhnes tn order to prevcnt
both crvilian agencres and the Bosnians them-
ts The lIr'ashtngton Post.25 iune 1997.
t6 Atlanttc rYev-s. 26 Septcmbcr 1997
tt Atlanttc,\ev,s. 26 Septcmber 1997 and
iv'RC-IIan de lsb I ad, 24 Scptember I 997.
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selves from becoming too attached to the pres-
ence of NATO troops. He agreed on the other
hand with those who said that the Alliance must
sustain its military involvement in Bosnia
because a sudden pull-out rvould leave a secunty
void and precipitate a shde torvards violence.
135 In preparation for the meeting of NATO
Defence Ministers in Maastncht on I ar,d 2
October, NATO Secretary-General, Javier Sol-
ana, declared that the priority for SFOR is not to
concentrate on full implementation of the Dalton
Agreement. As regards the end of the SFOR
mission m June 1998, Mr Solana affrrmed that
the intematronal community would not abandon
Bosnia but said it rvas too early to discuss a fol-
lorv-up to SFOR in concrete terms He did not
think that any country, including the United
States, would leave Bosnia completely but what
form any 
.follow-up force takes remams to be
seen.
136. The Western European NATO allies have
all expressed the opinion that m an)'post-SFOR
configuration, United States ground troops rvill
have to particrpate on the terntory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Most of them have also declared
that therr troops rvould leave the country if the
United States forces rvere to do so.
137 As regards the nature of a nerv successor
force, an important consideratron for all Euro-
pean goverrrments rvrth troops involved in SFOR
rvas expressed by' the British Defence Secretary
rvhen he said that if a neu, follor,r,-on force m
Bosnia were agreed "it rvill have to be NATO-
Ied, with NATO-led credrbilrtr', and *'rth all the
major players sharing the risks on the ground"r8
138 Theoretrcally', implementation of thc com-
bined loint task forces (CJTF) concept s,ould
provide Europeans vrrth the possrbrlrtl' of deplol'-
ing an SFOR successor force under the respon-
srbrlrtl,of WEU and under a European command
Most NATO and WEU officrals have reSected
thrs option as berng bey'ond WEU's capabrlitres.
In pnnciple. WEU rs capable of mountrng a
mrlrtary operatron of the Petersberg-t1pe, involv-
lng no more than l0 000 troops Recent devel-
opments, rvhrch rcsulted rn the decision to maln-
tain SFOR at rts rernforced level until an un-
specrfied date. clearlv rndrcate that the situation
in Bosnia and Herzegovina requires the presence
ofa substantial force, even after June I998.
139. There is, however, another rcason rvhy
Europeans rvill not deploy a successor force to
SFOR on their orvn. The purpose of a foreign
military presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
to ensure the secure environment lvhich is needed
for full implementation of the Dayton Agreement.
Thrs complicated Agreement, even rf its theoreti-
cal frameu,ork rs based on earlier European
peace initiatives, rvas drafted by the Americans,
rvho have also made great efforts to convince the
warring parties that they had no choice other than
to sign. The United States will therefore at least
have to assume its full co-responsibility to ensure
there is a secure environment for implementation
of the Agreement.
140. Apart from the abovementioned reasons,
there are developments in NATO which make the
continued involvement of US ground troops in-
evitable.
l4l. Bosnia is a testing ground for cooperation
between NATO and other countries x'hrch are, or
as the case ma), be are not, candidates for mem-
bership of NATO in its future enlargement Of
partrcular lmportancc is the cooperation betlveen
the I 500-strong Russian unit and NATO troops.
If any' serious trouble with this cooperatron rvere
to arise in Bosnia. this could be a bad omen for
Russran acquiescence to NATO's enlargement to
take in central European countries The very
broad range of recent SFOR operations against
war cnmlnals and TV transmitters rn Republika
Srpska, rvhrch led to Russian complaints and
critrcrsm in the NATO Permanent Councrl, have
shown that SFOR is w'alking a narro\\'trghtrope
142 In the United States, some members of
Congress see the cost of the US mrssron rn Bos-
nia as a barometer of the Adminrstratron's reli-
abrlity in projectrng expendrtures for NATO's
enlargement The)' point out that. rn the begin-
ning, the Adminrstratron put a $2.5 brlhon price
tag on the operatron in Bosnia, rvhich rs no\\' ex-
pected to cost at least 56 5 billlion.
143 Frnall1,, the NATO enlargement process
itself ma-v- u'ell be the most compelhng reason for
US troops not to lcavc Bosnra and Herzcgovina
It should be remembered here that thc United
States rn partrcular has argued most rntenselv in
favour of enlargement. Whatever mav bc said rn18 -,'".lhe Ptnanctal l.imes.5 September 1997
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offrcial declarations about uishrng to belong to
the family of Western democratic nations and
other high, idealistrc concepts, there is only one
real reason rvhy central European natrons want to
become members of NATO. it rvill provide them
with US security guarantees against any foreign
threat. The promrse of such guarantees will not
have any credibility if the United States military
forces leave Bosnia and Herzegovina before the
job is finished because Congress does not want to
spend more money on it or because it is afraid
that American soldiers will be killed.
144. An American commentator has noted that
the United States has no exit strategy for Bosnia,
but just a determrnation to get out before it gets
sucked in too far and Americans are killed. He
rightly concluded that fear of suffering casualties
is not a strategy and that it cannot be the sole
basis for making policyre.
145 There is a danger that as the debate over
NATO enlargement in the US Senate ap-
proaches, the Administration is likely to ward off
any possible problems for US troops in Bosnia,
rvith the consequence that rt rvill most probably
force SFOR troops to keep therr heads down and
not take any risks at ajuncture when an assertive
SFOR posture is vital for the success of the
Dayton peace process.
146. NATO military commanders have told the
Defence Ministers that for planning purposes a
decision on rvhat policy is to be followed after
June 1998 x'ill have to be taken by February
1998. If a force is to stay on after June 1998,
neu,oblectives ri'ill have to be set rvhich should
encompass more than the obvrous task of pre-
venting the situatron shdrng back rnto rvar.
XV. The internal potuer struggle in
Republika Srpska
147 . Srnce March 1997, a struggle for power
has been prttlng the President of Republika
Srpska, Biljana Plavsic. against Radovan
Karadzic and Momsrlo Kralrsnik, the Bosnian
Serb member of the co-presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
148. The split became apparent when the par-
liament of the Republic ratrfied an agreement
re Richard Cohen n The
Tribune, l2 September 1997.
between Republika Srpska and the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia on economic and military
cooperation. Thrs agreement had been signed by
President Milosevic and Mr Krajisnik. Accord-
ing to Mrs Plavsic, rvho was informed only after
the signing had taken place, Mr Krajisnik did not
have the right to sign on behalf of Republika
Srpska, rvhile the agreement itself ri'as not con-
sistent rvith the Dayton Agreement.
149. In April Mrs Plavsic launched a campaign
against high-level corruption b1' ordering an en-
quiry into two companies rvhich u'ere not paying
taxes. The companies concerned u'ere Centrex,
which has a monopoll,on imports and on sales of
fuel, tobacco, alcohol and building materials, and
Selkt-lmpex, lvhich uses part of the profits from
Centrex to pay bounties to police officers in Re-
publika Srpska. The ouners of these companies
are Mr Karadzic and Mr Krajrsnik At the end
of June, Mrs Plavsic sacked the Mrnister of the
Interior, Dragan Kr1ac, a supporter of Karadzic
who had undermined the cnquiry and *'ho,
against Mrs Plavsrc's urshes, had x'rthdraun a
pohce brigade from Banja Luka. The govern-
ment rn Pale then reinstated the Interior Minister
and the ruling SDS (Serbran Democratic Party)
then asked the Bosnran-Serb Parhament m Pale
to drarv up a procedure to depose President
Plavsic, upon ri'hich Mrs Plavsic ordered the
dissolution of parliament. On 20 Jull' she w'as
expelled from the SDS and told to step down as
President of the Repubhc. It should be noted
here that according to the Constrtution. the Presr-
dent can only'be removed bv a referendum
150 It should be borne rn mrnd that Mr
Karadzrc is an indicted rvar crtmtnal u'ho still
rvields great economic and polrtrcal tnflucncc tn
Repubhka Srpska Hrs supporters. farthful to hrs
leadershrp, have obstructed even' effort to unrte
the Serb Rcpubhc u'ith the rest of Bosnia and
Herzcgovrna Wrth a feu' exceptrons. Muslims
and Croats have not returned to therr homes rn
the Serbian part and the Serbs have blocked the
formation of a srngle central banli. farled to meet
arms control limrts, and srgned the abovemen-
tioned economrc and milrtary agrecment ri'ith the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavra, all in vrolation
of the Dayton Agreement
l5l. Mrs Plavsic rs no less a staunch nationalist
u'ho has alway's defended an ethnicalll' pure Rc-
publika Srpska, cal[ng cthntc cleansmg aInternattonal Herald
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"natural phenomenon". She contends that Serbs
can only be ludged by Serbs and has repeatedly
stated that she rs opposed to the extradition of
indicted Serb rvar cnminals to the ICTY rn The
Hague On the other hand, she claims that wide-
spread corruptron is destroyrng the viabilrtl' of
the Serb Republic.
152. The Republic's refusal to meet thc obliga-
tions of the Dayton Agreement has turned it rnto
the pariah of reconstruction aid and economic
development. Since the end of the rvar in 1995,
the economic output of the Croat-Muslim Fed-
eration has doubled and is expected to reach half
its pre-war level by the end of 1997 , rvhile devel-
opment rn Republika Srpska is still almost at a
standstill. Unemployment in the Federation has
dropped from 90 to 50%o, while it still stands at
90% in Republika Srpska. Barely 3o/o of the
$1.36 billion offrcial reconstruction aid granted
in 1996 \'ent to the Serb Republic. Most gov-
emment u'orkers have not been paid for months
and more than 10% of the Republic's 800 000
ciuzens depend on soup krtchens set up by' the
Red Cross
153 Mrs Plavsrc has nou' created her oun
politrcal paS', the Serbian Popular Alliance
(SNS). Its basic oblectives are to create a
national Serbian state, renounce the communrst
hentage and fight against criminality, and cor-
ruptlon,
154 In August, rumours of a coup against
Mrs Plavsic. organrsed by Pale, caused a rard by
SFOR troops on a number of police stations in-
cluding a specrahst police barracks u,hich u'ere
rn the hands of Karadzrc supporters and to thc
selzure of large numbers of unauthorrsed u'eap-
ons Later that month. SFOR troops helped sup-
porters of Mrs Plavsrc to break Mr Karadzrc's
monopolv over the informatron flou, by tempo-
ranlv taking control of TV transmitters. Mean-
rvhrle, srnce the end of August. supporters of Mrs
Plavsrc have started televrsron broadcasts from
Banla Luka SFOR also rntervcned in clashes
over transmitters and police statrons betrveen
Plavsrc and Karadzic supporters in Banja Luka,
Brcko. B1el1ina. Dobol and Prnjavor
155 At a NATO preparatory meeting at am-
bassador level on ll September 1997, the Rus-
sran Permanent Representatlve to NATO cntr-
crsed the ne\\'aggressrve Westem approach to the
SFOR mlssron, sa)'lng that lt was rncompatrble
u'rth the agreed rules of engagement In partrcu-
lar, Mr Vrtali Churkin complarned that by threat-
ening Bosnran Serbs and pursuing indicted Scrb
u'ar crrminals, the Western SFOR participants
rvere not acting in an evcn-handed u'av20
156. The Internatronal High Represcntative.
Carlos Westendorp, declared that the interna-
tional communitv u'as not going to allou' the
division of the Serb Republic. He added that the
present problems should be solved b-v peaceful
means, "by going to the polls and voting"zr.
157 . Finally', on 24 September 1997, Mrs
Plavsic signed an agreement rvith Mr Milosevic
and Mr Krajisnik r.vith the aim of preventing the
divrsion of Republika Srpska. It was agreed that
parhamentary elections u,ould be held on 15
November, follorved b1' elections for the Bosnian
Serb presidercl, 
- 
noro held by Mrs Plavsrc 
- 
and
for thc Serb member of thc 
.,;ornt Bosruan presi-
dency' 
- 
currentll, Mr Krajisnik 
- 
on 7 Deccmber.
Bosnran Serb tclevrsron rvill broadcast the viervs
of each srde in turn on alternate day,s and both
srdes s'ill take all necessar)' measures to stop
confrontatrons that could lead to a divrsron of
Republika Srpska The presidentral electrons
have already been postponed to next year be-
cause Western organisers declared that rt u,ould
be logisticallf impossrble to organrse them ear-
her The date of the parliamentary electrons is
still sublect to drscussron
I58. Even rf the agreement seems to have re-
moved the rmmediate danger of an undesirable
split in Repubhka Srpska, thc prospects are by
no means very clear or bright It rvould seem
that there rs still a long u,ay to go before there rs
a really free and rndependent press ln the Repub-
hc The outcome of thc presrdentral electrons is
unccrtarn If thev rvcrc to result rn a Karadzrc
supporter as Presrdent, the positron of the ex-
tremists u'ould agarn be rernforced and prospects
for furthcr rmplementation of the Dayton Agrec-
mcnt s'ould be extremell' bleak If Mrs Plavsic
rvcrc to marntarn her positron. the srtuation may
lmprove but the unrficd multr-ethnrc Bosnian
state mav remaln a dream
159 On I October, SFOR troops scized the
four televrsion transmrtters in Trebevrc,
Udrigovo. Leotar and Duge N.;rve *'hich w'ere
20 
-,ltlanttc I'erys, l7 September 1997
2t 
-.,'' I he Ptnanctal I tmes. 27 August 1997
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used by the Serb natronalists in Pale for their
political propaganda campaign. The opcration
was mounted at thc request of the International
High Representative. Carlos Westendorp, after
Pale's televisron station ignored repeated warn-
ings to behave. Later, Momsilo Kralisnrk was
given to understand that Pale q'ould have to
abide by a set of conditions if rt ri'anted its tele-
vision station back. These conditions included a
Western-appointed station director from abroad,
dismissal of the three SDS members on the board
of directors, including Mr Krajisnik. and re-
lvriting the station's charter.
160. SFOR transferred control over these
transmitters to supporters of Mrs Plavsic, but
although she called the SFOR operation justified,
she also recalled the agreement of 24 September
1997 according to rvhich prograrnmes from Pale
and Banja Luka rvould alternate on the electronic
medra of Republika Srpska. In the "interest of
Republika Srpska" she drd not wrsh to have an
informatron monopoly,22
16l. It seemed that rn this matter the UN High
Representative. rn cooperation rvrth SFOR, is
pursuing a dangerous course In a democratic
state, free and independent media are part of the
freedom of expression u,hich is also stipulated rn
Article II of the Constitution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Annex 4 to the Dayton Agree-
ment). A government monopoll, on information
cannot be tolerated, but replacing a govemment
monopoly u'ith an opposition monopoly is not an
improvement if the ob.;ecilve is freedom of ex-
pression. El'en-handedness is an important ele-
ment in peacekeeprng actrvities. It is vital for the
preservation of SFOR's authontl,
162. Mr Westendorp ls therefore now propos-
ing a transitronal measure to assure non-partisan
televrsron co\.'erage He has asked thc Contact
Group to approve the crcatron of a panel of
judges and loumahsts - partly, rnternational.
partly local 
- 
to set edrtorial standards and cn-
force them untrl Bosnra creates a srmilar systcm
of its orm
163 No agreement has yet been reached about
parliamentan' electrons in Repubhka Srpska
The Unrted States rs rn favour because, Iike Mrs
Plavsic, it thrnks thev may reinforce the position
of the relativelv moderate polrtrcians and improve
prospects for implementing the Day,ton Agree-
ment. France, Germanl'and thc United Kingdom
are onl1, lukeu,arm about such elections, believ-
ing they rvill not change the polrtical scene dccr-
sively. Russra u,ill only allow parliamentary
elections to take place if there is a commitment to
hold presidentral elections at a later date Mr
Krajisnik has even said that he u'ould not coop-
erate if parliamentary elections u'ere held and
that he could not guarantee the safe[, of election
monitors. A decision to hold electrons rvill have
to be taken before the end of October 1997.
XW. Eastern Slavonia
164. Municipal and regional elections took
place in Eastern Slavonra on 13 and 14 April
1997, al the same time as rn the rest of Croatia.
The Head of the Unrted Nations Transitional
Admrnistration rn Eastern Slavonia ([INTAES),
Jacques Klein, declared the elections. in which
85o/o of Scrb voters participated, a success Ac-
cordrng to a Jornt declaration by LTNTAES and
the Croat authoritres rn Zagreb, 15 650 Croat
and 14 136 Serb votes vvere cast. In Vukovar
and l6 other municipalitres, non-Serbian parties
won the majorrtl' of votes. while in I I munici-
palities the majorrtv \\'as won by the Serbran In-
dependent Democratic partv.
165. At the end of Aprrl, Eastern Slavonia's
reintegration into Croatia began u'ith the return
of the Croatian public services and banking ac-
tivities and a start rvas made on restoring the 1u-
dicial sy'stem
166. The return of refugees to Eastern Slavonra
is strll a problem that must be soh,ed An estr-
mated 70 000 Croat refugees are strll living
elsewhere. Many' of thc Serbs hving rn Eastern
Slavonra fled therr homcs m other Serb-hcld
areas rn Croatia durrng the Croatran offensive
against rebel Serbs rn Kra.lina in August 1995
Full rcintegration of Eastern Slavonra into the
Repubhc of Croatra should be accomplished b1,
15 January 1998. at the cnd of the prolonged
LiNTAES mandate The problem of the retum of
Croats to therr homes can onlv be resoh'ed rf the
Croatran Government also authorrses Serbs to
return to the homes from u'hich thev were ex-
pelled rn 1996
167 On 8 June 1997, Presrdent Tud.lman de-
clared that all ethnrc Serbs u'ho recognrsed22 NRC-Hancle t sb lad, 2 October 1997
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Croatra as therr home and obtained Croatian
documents u'erc rvelcome to stay in Croatra. He
added, how'ever, that not all of Croatia's
150 000-200 000 Serb refugees could rcturn
home because that u'ould lead to discord and
war.
168. In Resolution 1120 of 14 July 1997, the
Unrted Natrons Securit.v Councrl noted that a
lack of the necessary conditions prevented the
retum in an1' substantial numbers of those dis-
placed persons seeking to return to Eastern Sla-
vonia from other parts of Croatia. It therefore
asked the Government of Croatia to promptly
eliminate the adminrstrative and legal obstacles
to the return of refugees and displaced persons
and to create the necessary conditions of security,
safety and social and economlc opportunity for
those returning to therr homes in Croatia. At the
same trme. the Securrty Council extended the
mandate of LINTAES until l5 January 1998 and
endorsed the proposal for achieving the rvith-
drau,al of the UNTAES mrlrtary component by
l5 October 1997.
169. In earll' October, the LN Secretary-Gen-
eral, Kofi Annan, presented a report to the Se-
cuntl' Councrl on the situatron in Eastern Slavo-
nia. The report argues that Croatia has made no
efforts at reconcrliatron u,ith the Serbs living rn
Croatra If the Secunty Council adopts the Sec-
retarl'-General's recommendatron, Croatia u'ill
not be grven control over Eastern Slavonia until
early' 1998 The last phase of wrthdrawal of the
LTNTAES mrhtan' force started on 15 October,
but the 400-strong LIN crvrhan police force and
the 100 LIN mrlrtarl' obsen'ers urll have to stay
at least untrl l5 January 1998
170 In hrs rcport. Mr Annan concluded that the
actron taken b1' Croatra rn reccnt months shou's
consrderablc shortcomings and a lack of polrtrcal
u-rll. Progress has been made on the burlding of
constitutronal bodies but, accordrng to thc rcport.
not enough has been done to garn thc confidcnce
of thc Croatran Serbs rn the region, to prel'cnt
harassment and to achieve a smooth transition
XWI. The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM)
l7l As rs so often the case in the Balkans, the
polrtrcal problcms rn FYROM have their roots in
thc comphcated hrstory of the region.
172 Histoncal Macedonia was three times
larger than the present-day FYROM After five
centunes of Ottoman rule, Macedonia was inte-
grated rn the nerv Bulgarra in 1873. In l9l3 the
Treatl of Bucharest divided Macedonia among
Bulgana, Greece and Serbia. The People's Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia. proclatmed in 1945,
included the Serbran part of Macedonia and of-
ficially recognrsed tts language. Frnally, this re-
pubhc proclarmed its independence in September
l99l and rvas recognised by the United Natrons
in 1993 under the provisional name of FYROM.
173. Srnce 1991, Greece has been adamant in
its opposrtron to recognise the new republic under
the name "Macedonia" and imposed an economic
blockadc on FYROM in February 1994. After
FYROM agreed to alter rts flag, the blockade
was hfted in October 1995. Under an interim
agreement signed in September 1995, FYROM
and Greece agreed to negotlatlons on a pelrna-
nent name Thcse negottattons arc still under
rval' and no progress has becn reported smce
then. During thc armed conflict tn former
Yugoslavra. the IIN Secuntl' Councrl drspatched
a small obsen'ation force to FYROM's northern
border rn recognition of the potentral threat to
peace and securitv m the nerv repubhc In 1995,
Serbra mounted a series of provocative and man-
rpulatrve operations. including border incidents,
rvith the arm of destabihsing FYROM rnternally.
The presence and mediation of IIN troops have
prevented further escalation. In April 1996 a
treatl' betu'een the Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via and FYROM. rn rvhrch FYROM \\'as recog-
nrsed, set up a Jolnt commtttee to definc the
countn"s borders once and for all It also refers
to thc rrghts of Serbs rn FYROM and those of
Macedonrans rn thc Fcdcral Repubhc of Yugo-
slavra
174 For thc first tune rn rts hrston'. and at the
request of the Prcsrdcnt of the Repubhc of
FYROM. the Unrtcd Nations has sent
peacekeeprng troops to a countn on a detcrrent
mrsslon The first units arnved rn January and
Februan 1993 Tho' consrsted of a Nordrc bat-
tairon of 700 soldrcrs from Denmark, Finland.
Nonvav and Su'edcn. In June 1993, ii'rth the
consent of the Govemments of FYROM and the
United States. the Unrted Natrons Secunty
Councrl adopted Resolutron 842 (1993) on the
deplorment of a contrngent of 300 US soldters m
FYROM as part of the IJNPROFOR missron
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175. In Resolution 983 (1995), the Security
Council declared that LINPROFOR rvithin
FYROM would be known as the United Natrons
Preventive Deployrnent Force ([INPREDEP).
I-INPREDEP became an indepcndent mission
reporting drrectly to UN Headquarters in New
York. The peacekeeping troops have a preven-
trve role u,hich conslsts in observing and in con-
veying informatron on anv developments u'hich
may endanger the securitl', stability' and territo-
rial integrity of FYROM. The IIN force is de-
ployed to monitor the northem border, particu-
Iarly on the Kosovo srde. UNPREDEP's mandate
rvas originally scheduled to end on 30 November
I 995.
176. Securitl, Council Resolution 1027 (1995)
extended UNPREDEP's mandate untrl 30 May
1996 when the mandate was again prolonged
until 30 November 1996 (Resolution 1058).
177. In the light of the possrble destabilising
effect on FYROM of scrious unrest in neighbour-
ing Albania, a Resolution of 9 April reaffirmed
the extension of LNPREDEP's mandate
(originally deployed to prevent conflicts in for-
mer Yugoslavia spilling into FYROM) untrl 3l
May 1997 Another six-month extension until 30
November 1997 lvas decided by Resolution I110
(1997) Until recently, the force consisted of tu,o
500-man mechanrsed infantry bat[alions, a Nor-
drc composite battalion and a US armv Lask force
and an additional 5O-man Indonesian engrneering
platoon, but the Security Council has decrded on
a tu'o-month phased reduction of the mrssion's
military component by 300 men of all ranks,
starting on I October 1997.
178 The presence of a sizeable Albanian
mrnority rn FYROM has been a possrble source
of tensron from the beginnrng of the Repubhc's
exrstence and tensron has rccently,started to nse
rvrthout anv real prospects for rmprovement
179 Accordrng to the 1994 census. 665oh of
the countn,'s populatron of tu,o mrllron are
"Macedonrans". Albanrans constrtute 22 9o/o and
the remaining 10.60/o are Turks, Roms. Serbs,
Vlachs and others Albanrans clarm that thel'
constitute 30%o of the populatron and dcmogra-
phers sa1' that if the present brrth-rates and mi-
gratlons from Albanra and Kosovo continue. Al-
banians could become a ma.;ontv rvlthrn l5
years The Constitution guarantees the rights of
all citizens of the Repubhc. but Albanians sa)/
that its preamble reduces them to second-class
crtrzens and they are demanding the status of
"constituent nation". From the outset, the Gov-
ernment of FYROM has always tried to steer a
course between its fear of Albanran secession and
the creation of a "Grcater Albarua" and there rs
both internal and extcmal pressure to grant more
rights to Albanran cltlzens, who are represented
in the parliament and rvhose moderate wing is a
partner in the governing coalrtron
180. Many incidents have taken place. In 1994,
the parliament rejected a draft larv to grant the
Albanian language offrcial status. but allolved
the teaching of the Albanian language in the
teacher-training department of Skopje University.
In the same year, Albanians formallv established
an ethnic Albanian university in Tetovo, rvhich
u'as condemned as illegal by the Government
The clandestine Tetovo Universitv has repeatedly
been the scene of violent clashes betu'een stu-
dents and the police. In 1996, ethnic Albanians
became much more vocrferous rn making their
polrtical demands and thrs led to a secessron in
the moderate Party for Democratrc Prosperrtl'
(PDP). rvhrch is a coalition partner rn the gov-
emment The neu'11,-formed and far more radical
Partl' for Democratrc Prosperitv of the Albanrans
in Macedonia (PDPA) won the autumn 1996
local elections in a number of important munrcr-
palities such as Gostivar and Tetovo. This devel-
opment has led to a more radrcal posrtron being
taken by the PDP rvhose leader, Ismet Ramadani.
has been quoted as saying that hrs par[' "can
onlv cnvisage remalnlng in the governmcnt coali-
tion rf the Albanran language is recognised and rf
the Albanran community offrcialli' has a unrver-
srtr,''"
l8l The most recent rncrdents took place rn
Gostrvar and Tetovo in Jull' 1997, rihen the
PDPA mavors horsted the Albanran flag rn dcfi-
ancc of a neu' larv. There rvere 'r'rolent clashes
ri'rth the police, rvith three ethnrc Albanrans krlled
and over 300 arrestcd, rncludrng the mavors rvho
u'ere later sentenccd rn court Tetovo's mayor
sard he was rn favour of a multr-ethnic state. but
that the idca of joining a Grcatcr Albanra rvould
become a necessitl, "if government repressron of
Albanians contrnues"2'
23 Le JtIoncle.3l Mar, 1997
'o The I,',ronctal Ttmcs.22 lult' 1997
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182. The OSCE's Hrgh Commissioner for Min-
oritres is playing a useful role in medration ef-
forts between the trvo ethnic groups. On the
other hand, it would appear that the presence of
United Nations forces on a deterrent mission is
nou'becomrng more important for the prevention
and management of mounting internal strife and
of Albanran secessronist activrties. Under these
circumstances, one is prompted to ask lvhether
the Security Council took a x'rse decision in re-
ducing the UN mission's military component.
Europe and its transatlantic allies must remain
involved in this unique crisis-prevention effort,
rvith both civilian organisations and military
forces on the spot, and follow developments
closely from day to day so that they are not taken
by surprise and confronted wrth a drfficult situa-
tion in which it might be too late to take any ac-
tion
XWII. Mounting unrest in Kosovo
183. Kosovo, the heartland of medieval Serbia
and a historic battleground of the Serbs against
the Ottomans, continues to be a dangerous source
of tension in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
rvhich deserves close attention The population of
this province consrsts of 90% Albanrans and
l0% Serbs Under Tito, Kosovo was granted the
status of an autonomous provlnce of Serbia and
the Albanians were given consrderable local
power and cultural rrghts When Slobodan
Milosevic came to power rvith hrs strongly na-
tronalist ideas. his first actrons u'ere drrected
agalnst Albanian dominance in Kosovo. He vrr-
tualll' removed all the Albanians' political and
cultural nghts, includrng therr control of the Al-
banian language library and therr administratron
of the school system. The presence of Serbran
police and milrtary forces rvas rernforced and
violatron of the Albanrans' human rights u'as
accompanied by' a regrme of ruthless repressron
Serbrans used even' possible method to prevent
the Albanian populatron usrng the confused
srtuatron of the u'ar rn former Yugoslavia to gain
mdependence Terrorist actrons and political
kilhngs contrnued to keep tensions near fever
prtch. Both the Unrted States and the European
Unron u'arned President Mrlosevrc repeatedly not
to overplav his hand in Kosovo and used eco-
nomic sanctlons to tr)' to convrncc the Serb Gov-
ernment to re-estabhsh the human and polrtrcal
rrghts of the Albanians
184. In January, 1997, the Chairman-in-Offrce
of the General Affairs Council of the European
Union, Hans van Mierlo, declared that the EU
could not negotiate with Belgrade until the situa-
tion rn Kosovo improved When the United
States Secretary of State Madeleine Albnght met
with Ibrahim Rugova, leader of the Albanian
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), she issued
a statement in rvhtch, among other things, she
said: "Ethnic Albanrans in Kosovo are still de-
nied their most basrc human and political rights
and suffer repeated abuses at the hands of Ser-
bian authonties, particularly the pohce and the
courts. Real progress on improving the situation
in Kosovo remains a central element of the Outer
Wall of sanctrons against Serbia. There will be
no relief from sanctrons untrl Belgrade has taken
concrete steps to address the legitrmate griev-
ances of the Kosovo Albanran community."
185. Neither the United States nor the European
Union supports independence for Kosovo and
they argue that a solutron to the problems of
Kosovo can and must be found within the
framework of Serbia and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
186. Recent devclopments in Kosovo have not
been encouragmg In September 1996, an
agreement on education \\'as concluded between
Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia, and
Ibrahrm Rugova, politrcal leader of the Albanian
community in Kosovo. Srnce then, however, no
real progress has been made to implement the
agreement The prehmrnan' protocol envisaged
the return of pnman' and secondary school
pupils and unrversity students to pubhc estab-
hshments for an educatron rn the Albantan lan-
guage. The comrnrttee set up to fix a date for
thrs rctum has not vet takcn a decrsron rvhrch.
accordrng to the Albanran leaders. rs the result of
a lack ofcooperatron on the part ofthe Scrbs.
187 Albanian leaders maintarn that negotra-
tions u'ith the Serbs. rvhrch are takrng place
through the medratron of thc Roman Catholic
Sant'Egrdio communlt\. are not completell'
blocked At the end of September 1997, students
in Pristrna started to hold demonstratrons, de-
manding full recognrtron of therr hngurstrc and
cducatronal rights and on I October, a demon-
stration of a feu thousand students led to vlolcnt
clashes lvhcn rt s'as broken up b1 a police forcc
Also rn September 1997. I I Serb pohce stailons
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were overrun in a coordinated attack by members
of a movement rvhich calls rtself the Kosovo Lib-
eration Army (KLA). Since the beginning of
1997, some 20 Albanians have been killed in
Kosovo through terrorist activities, some of
which have been clamed by the KLA. A number
of the Albanians u'ho rvere krlled rvere knoun for
their relations with the Serb Govemment
Twentl, presumed members of the KLA have
been sentenced to imprisonment for "terrorist
activities".
188. It is doubtful u'hether the moderate Alba-
nian leaders wrll contmue to be able to control
the population, which is tired of not seeing any
progress in negotiations. There are signs that the
massive support in Kosovo for the non-violent
civil disobedrence campaign led b), Ibrahrm
Rugova is crumbling The more radical move-
ment of Adem Demaki, rvhich has emphasised
the risks involved in the emergence of terrorist
groups, is building up support. This may cause
the moderate leaders to adopt a more intransigent
attitude torvards the Serbs in order to avoid being
accused of betraying the Albanran cause
189. It should be noted that at the samc time,
the economic and polrtrcal situation rn Serbia has
caused a return to radrcalism and natronalism, as
rvas clearly demonstrated in parliamcntary and
presidential electrons held in September and
October 1997 The second round of the presi-
dential electrons. held on 5 October last, was de-
clared void because of a tumout lust belorv the
legal threshold of 50% and the date of new elec-
tions has not ),et been fixed Both candidates for
the presidenct,, Zoran Lihc and Volislav Sesell,
left no doubt over their nationalist convictions
rvith Mr Seselj declaring that he opposed any
arrangement ri'ith the ethnrc Albanian malorrtv in
Kosovo.
190. This leaves lirtle hope for an improvemcnt
in the srtuatron in Kosovo If the European Union
and Western European Unron contrnue to declare
that they have an interest ln peace and secuntv rn
Europe, they' are obhged to follorv developments
m Kosovo closely, not least m order to be ready
for action if need be. Events in Albania have
demonstrated horv badll' Western Europc is pre-
pared to copc u,rth a cnsis rn a country which has
consistently been hrgh on the hst of areas of rn-
stability and possrble outbreaks of r,'rolence Its
reactions came late and reluctantlv This should
not happen again if Europe continues to affrrm
that it has a vital interest in peace in the Balkans.
XIX. Albania and lllEU's Multinational
Advisory Police Element (MAPE)
l9l. Developments rn Albanra in the first half
of 1997 dcmonstrated hou,, even in a closely
monitored European country rvrth a rvrdell' rec-
ognrsed potential for internal instabilrty, the
situatron can raprdly deteriorate and get out of
control.
192. A volatile situation rvith increasrng social
unrest developed in early 1997 when a number of
pyramid finance schemes collapsed. Income
from these schemes rvhich had accumulated an
estimated total of Sl billion in investments had
become important for a large proportion of the
deprived population.
193 In 1996, the Albanian Government startcd
to take legal action in response to u'arnings from
intematronal financial institutions, but it was too
late and rnsuffrcrent to prevent a financial disas-
ter and violent demonstrations. In particular. in
the southern part of Albania the demonstratrons
escalated into a rebellion. Large quantrties of
weapons. including healy weapons such as tanks
and anti-aircraft guns, fell into the hands of reb-
elhous groups consrsting of an exotic mtxturc of
civilians, the mrlitary, policemen and criminals.
194. At the begiruring of March, the govem-
ment proclarmed a state of emergenc)', rmposed a
nationlvide curferv and sent in troops to take
control of the rebellious southem torrns, but all
this u,as to no avarl. After medratron bl,both the
EU and the OSCE, President Berisha agreed to
the demands of the opposrtion to form a broad-
based govcrnment of national reconciliation
195 Immediatelv aftcr rts formation on 12
March, the neu' govcrnment of Pnme Mrnrstcr
Bashkrm Fino appealed for outsrde military,
assistance to restore order m Albania NATO
made rt knorm that rt drd not plan anv mrlrtan'
intervcntron The Assembly of WEU, meetrng ln
Athens on 13 and 14 March 1997. through its
Standing Commrttec adopted a recorrrmondation
urging that the Council'
" 1. Monrtor very closely the dcvelopment
of the situation rn Albanra rn order to be
prepared to act rf requested to do so;
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2. Instruct the WEU Satellite Centre in
Torrejon to provide ongoing assessments
of the srtuation in Albania for use by both
the Council and the Planning Cell and
provide it rvith the means to accelerate its
rvorking procedures;
3. Ask the Planning Cell to draw up
contrngency plans for possible operations
in Albania covering the full range of
Petersberg operations from humanitarian
and rescue tasks to peacekeeping tasks and
peacemaking, including control over the
restitution of arms and munitions."
196. The EU Foreign Ministers discussed the
Albanian crisis at their meetrng in Apeldoorn
(The Netherlands) on 15 and 16 March. Since
no consensus could be reached to dispatch a
milrtary force as asked for by the Albanian Gov-
ernment, it rvas agreed to send a small military
and police advisory force. An EU Foreign Min-
rsters' meeting in Rome on 25 March did not re-
sult in an1'thing more substantial
197 At an OSCE meetmg on 26 and 27 March,
a u,illingness to meet an Albanian request for
assrstance u'as shou.n Frnalll'on 29 March, the[N Securitl' Council adopted Resolution I l0l
which allorved indivrdual states to help the Al-
baruan Government to restore order The man-
date for such an operation, as formulated by the
UN Securitv Council, rvas to "facilitate the safe
and prompt delivery of humanrtarran assistance,
and to help create a secure environment for the
missions of rnternational organrsations in Alba-
nia, includrng those providrng humanitarian as-
slstance"
198. A multinational protection force in Alba-
nia (MPFA) rvas then established u,rth Italv as
the lead natlon The follori'rng states partrci-
pated ltalr' (3006 troops), France (963), Greece
(802); Turkey' (774), Romania (399); Spain
(341). Austria (l l3), Denmark (59) and Sloverua(23) In particular Italy had an rnterest in the
restoration of order rn Albanra because Albani-
ans had started to flee thetr countn, bv crossrng
the Adrratic Sea and seekrng refuge in Italy.
199. Operation ALBA 
- 
as rt was called 
-
started on Albanian territon' on 14 Apnl 1997
and finrshed in mid-August 1997 after an exten-
sion of the origrnal three-month mandate by 45
days The multrnational force u'as deployed to
providc humanitarian aid, protect observers and
oversee the 29 June elections, but regrettably it
did nothing to recover the hundreds of thousands
ofguns and other \\,eaponr)'ransacked from state
armouries when statc authority collapsed in
March 1997.
200. The main political partres in Albania then
agreed on a new electoral larv and elections rvere
held on 29 June wrth a sccond round on 6 Jul1,
1997 The elections \\,ere monrtored by some
500 OSCE and Council of Europe observers,
backed by the MPFA. In early June, the chief of
the OSCE's monitoring operation resigned, ac-
cusing the OSCE of "planning a u'hitervash of
elections to grve the multinational force an ex-
cuse to go home". Although the elections cer-
tainly did not go rvithout incrdent, the head of the
obseryers' mrssion, in accordance rvith your
Rapporteur's proposal, later declared them to be
"adequate and acceptable at this stage". The
opposition Socralist Party of Albanra (PSS) to-
gether wrth its allies rvon 118 seats out of the
155 The PSS leader, Fatos Nano, rvas later
elected President to succeed Sali Berisha rvho
had resrgned after the defeat of his Democratrc
Party of Albania (PDS)
201. Italy is strll grapphng rvrth the conse-
quences of the exodus of a total 16 000 Albanr-
ans across the Adnatrc Sea Of this number,
around 2 500 have returned voluntarrll,. Another
3 500 u,ere sent back upon arnval or have been
expelled, rvhile an estimated 3 000 have gone mto
hiding Accordrng to an agreement between the
governments of Itall' and Albanra n'hrch rs con-
nected rvith a three-vear HFL 2-50 mrlhon aid
programme, the remainrng 7 000 refugees rvrll
have to return to Albania before I December
1997 Meanrvhrle, a steadv stream of rllegal
immigrants from Albanra rs strll flourng rnto
Italy
202 Although 
- 
at therr meetrng of 15-16
March 1997 tn Apcldoorn 
- 
the EU Foreign
Mrnistcrs could not agrcc to send a mrlrtar.r, force
to Albanra, thev evcntualll' agreed to drspatch a
mrlrtary and pohce "advrson force" to help the
new goverrrment restore ordcr A fact-findrng
delegation urth the particrpatron of trvo officcrs
from the WEU Planning Cell, visrted Albania in
mid- and late March.
203. Among other things. thrs deiegatron con-
cluded that the cvents in early 1997 had lcd to
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virtually total disintegration of the Albanian po-
hce force. Not only had man1, policemen Ieft the
force, but also much of its equipment had been
Iost through lootmg, rvhrle rvhat remained of the
force was poorly educated and trained. All in all,
there was an obvious need to restore the Al-
banian population's trust and confidence in their
police.
204. As a consequence of the findings of this
mission, the WEU Council decided on 2 May
1997 to establish a Multinational Advisory Po-
lice Element (MAPE) in order to provide both
advice and training to the Albanian police auth-
orities.
205 The main missions of the MAPE are to'
advise the central echelon on larv and
order, frontier policing and the re-
constitutron of the Police Academy;
- 
organlse training programmes.
206. A MAPE advance party rvas deployed to
Trrana on 13 May 1997, but the deployment of
the main element could not begin until after the
srgnature of the Memorandum of Understandrng
rvith the Albanran authonties on 24 June. Due to
the election process and its aftermath, which re-
quired a concentrated effort bv the Albanran po-
lice, the MAPE short-term programmc only
started rn mrd-July.
207. Apart from recommendatrons and advice
to the Albanian police dunng and after the elec-
tron process. the short-terrn programme consrsts
of.
- 
advrce to the Mrnrstrl' of the Intenor
on an earlv rcstructunng of thc Al-
banian pohce force and on reorgani-
satron rvrthin the Ministn' rtself To
this end, a MAPE office has nou'becn
established u'rthrn thc Mrnrstry of thc
Interror ri'hich facrlitatcs frequent
contacts betrveen the MAPE Seruor
Advisor and the officrals rn charge of
the Albanran pohce.
training conslstmg of mstructron and
advice on patrol organisatron, check-
points and commuruty' pohcrng and
trarnrng for the managcment of pubhc
order,
support for border police. training pro-
grammes arc being conducted con-
centrating on border pohce responsi-
bilities and customs liaison;
- 
support for the Police Academy: a
u'orkshop course has been started to
retrain the 25 key Academy mstructors.
A basic training syllabus has been
dcveloped and is read1, for im-
plementation
208. In September 1997 the WEU Council de-
cided to extend the mandate of the MAPE for an
initial period of six months from 12 October
1997 to 12 April 1998 u,ith the option of further
extensions thereafter. At the same time, the
Council approved the concept for a long-term
prograrrrme, taking note that the MAPE's per-
sonnel strength in the initial phase ri'ould be no
greater than some 60 offrcers.
XX. Conclusions
209. Beauty rs in the eye of the beholder25 In
many ways, this sa1'rng also apphes to the vari-
ous assessments of thc present srtuation in former
Yugoslavra and rn particular rn Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
210. A rvholly objective assessment does not
exist; that rvould be a contradrcfio tn termtnts.
Authorities r,r'ho have an almost personal mterest
in the success of the Dayton peace process, tcnd
to take an optrmrstic vieu,. Rrchard Holbrooke,
architect of the agrcement, sees "srgnificant srgns
of progress" Samuel Berger, US Natronal Sc-
curlty Adviser, says that "peace rs begrnning to
take root". President Ahla Izetbegol'rc declares
that "the srtuatron rs bctter" and that "thcre rs
hopc for the futurc" Many, commcntators and
analysts take a morc negative vle\\' Thcv sa1'
that optrmrstic vreu s are based on theologv and
not on the facts A numbcr of them havc bluntl)'
proposed a partltlon of thc countn' u'hich. thev
say. rvill allou,foreign troops to leave
2ll Your Rapporteur wrll provide his oun per-
sonal assessment. partlv based on visrts to Bos-
nia and Hcrzegovma and Albania during thc
surrrmcr of 1997
3I
25 Margaret Hungerford ( I 855- I 897)
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212. The mrnisterial meeting of the Steering
Board of the Peace Implementation Council in
Sintra on 30 May' 1997 was a turning pornt. The
concluding political declaration rvhrch was pub-
hshed after the meeting stated in diplomatic lan-
guage that the signatories of the Dayton peace
agreement made a mockery of rts implementa-
tion. No less than 94 paragraphs were needed to
denounce the manl, issues u,here no or lrttle prog-
ress had been made. Deadhnes were set for fur-
ther implementation, minrsters and other hrgh
authonties toured the region to read the riot act
to all political leaders and threaten them rvith the
denial of reconstruction aid and other sanctlons.
At the same time, SFOR adopted a more asser-
tive attitude, officially'rvithout any change in its
mandate
213. AII this actrviS' did lead to some further
progress because a number of political leaders
understood that a total failure to act might stop
the florv of foreign aid money' which rvas not un-
rvelcome. Others. horvever, especialll' manl'
leaders rn Repubhka Srpska, contrnued to block
any significant progress, partly because they did
not care about foreign aid moner', having com-
plete control over the repubhc's economy to thetr
oun profit
214. Wrth the exceptron of the Mushm leaders,
vvho are the only ones to garn from it, ferv of the
polrtical leaders ln po\\'er in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. Croatra and the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia seem to be in a hurrl' to implement
the Dal,ton peace agreement, In fact, manl' seem
to thrnk rt is only a matter of trme before the for-
elgn troops leave, enabling them to settle the final
account urth thcrr adversaries
215 There has not 1,et becn a fundamental
breakthrough in the deadlock whrch !\'as ac-
knorvledged rn the Srntra Declaration of 30 Mav
In the pubhc debate this has resulted in proposals
to proceed u'rth a partltlon of Bosnra and Herze-
govina into a Croat. a Muslim and a Serb part.
The UN, OSCE and SFOR. or rts successor
force, n'ould have to supenlse such a process
but thrs u'ould not takc long and rvould enable
foreign troops to lear e farrlv soon
216 It should hosever bc noted that for many
reasons thrs proposal does not provide a solution
Partitron riould mean officral endorsemcnt of
ethnrc cleansing and uould encourage racrsm and
extremist nationalism elservhere rn the Balkans
where simrlar problems strll remain unresolved
217. But apart from this fundamental consid-
eration, there are also practical reasons for ex-
cluding partition as a solution. Secret talks be-
tu'eerr the leaders of the ethnic commuruties have
been held to drscuss a redrawing of the map, but
the1, have not been able to come close to an
agreement. Anv partrtion rvould have to include
massive migration since half the Croat popula-
tion, rvhich is now dispersed across central Bos-
nia, would rvish or would have to be moved to
western parts. Not one of the neu mmi states
rvould be economicalll,viable as a separate state.
The neu'Mushm state would be landlocked, sur-
rounded by uncooperative, if not hostile, netgh-
bours.
218 The equip and train progralnme, combined
rvith a secret rearmament schedule rs grving the
Muslims a clear qualrtative milrtan'edge rvhich,
in the event of partltron, might rnduce them to
take advantage of the mood of demoraltsatton of
the population, the qualrtative ueakentng of the
armed forces ln Republika Srpska and the
political crisis in Serbra to try to estabhsh a more
vrable Muslim state, including the exchange of
groups of people and territory by force
219. If Serbra succaeded rn sulrnounting its
present politrcal crisis by reinforcing the extrem-
ist nationalist posrtion, this could also lead to a
scenano rn rvhrch Croats and Serbs divided
Bosnra and Herzegovina betu'een themselves,
leavrng an independent Muslim state u'ith no
chancc of sun'rval
220 The forergn countries tnvolved in a solu-
tron of the Bosnian cnsrs apparentlv have no
chorce other than to strck to the rmplementatlon
of the Dayton peacc agrecment Thts can onlv bc
donc successfullv if they' are also prepared to
marntain mrlrtan forces in Bosnra and Herze-
govrna bey'ond June 1998 These forces should
include a substantral elemcnt of Unrted Statcs
ground troops Thc marn reasons for a prolonged
commitment are the fundamcntal responsrbrlitl' of
the Unrted States for the estabhshment of the
Dayton Agrcement. continued sohdarity u'ith rts
alhes rn a mrlrtary operation u,hrch thev started
together and thc crcdrbihty of rts confessed
rnterest in European securrtv at a 
.;uncture rvhcn
NATO enlargcment is a prrorrty rssue
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221. For horv long will foreign troops have to
stay? Experience has suffrcientll, demonstrated
that no miracles can be expected as regards the
implementation of Dayton. The establishment of
an integrated multi-ethnic state will take time.
Trme is also needed to heal the wounds of a sav-
age \^'ar which tore a country apart. Historically,
such u'ars have always'ended in the victory of
one of the parties followed by' dictatorship of the
victor. Since the international community did not
allorv that to happen, it must no$' assume its re-
sponsibility to see a different and fundamentally
more civilised solution through to its completion.
222. Under the present circumstances, giving an
SFOR successor force a l2 or l8 month mandate
rvould not make sense. As happened with SFOR
immediately after its establishment, a debate
u,ould start between supporters and opponents of
an extenslon of the mandate. Moreover, it is im-
portant to remember that further implementation
of the Dayton Agreement will still be a long
drann-out process. Many problems remain to be
solved: fewer than 30 000 out of a total of more
than I 5 million refugees and displaced persons
have returned to their homes; the establishment 
-
rvith the help of the IPTF 
- 
of modern, demo-
cratically-controlled law-enforcement agencies is
as yet in its infancy; the enigma of implementing
local election results in municipalitres x,here the
u,inners are no longer livrng looms large; a num-
ber of important rndicted war criminals have still
not been brought to The Hague and freedom of
movement is still not a reality. In addition, there
is a need to eradicate corruption and other com-
mon practlces that are hampenng the develop-
ment of a healthy econom)/ rncluding a prosper-
ous middle class with a personal interest in
ensuring that the proccss of democratlsatlon con
tinues. Obviously,, an SFOR successor force can-
not enforce solutions to all thcse problems. but it
can malntaln the secure environment which is
vital for further rmplementation of the Dayton
Agreement and provide assistance where possible
or needed. Such a force rvould have rts hands
full for another few 1,ears. It therefore seems
that the mandate for such a successor force will
have to cover a period of at least 3 to 5 years,
with 6-monthly reviews of the situation. Leaving
earlier, if circumstances allorv, u'ould be seen as
a positive sign.
223. What size should a successor force be? It
is difficult to provide exact figures but expe-
nence wrth SFOR has demonstrated that there is
no reason to be too optimistic. SFOR's original
schedule included reducing the rnitral 31 000
troops to less than 20 000 troops rn June 1997 in
what was called a "deterrence mode" In view of
the situation, SFOR was reinforced to a strength
of 36 000 troops rn August and will maintain this
strength until further notice. It is thought here
that a SFOR successor force should start with
around 25 000 to 30 000 troops. This successor
force should be highly mobile and structured in
smaller and more flexible units. Its drstribution
ovcr the territory should be different and in par-
ticular it should be concentrated in areas which
are knoun to be potential troublespots
224. There is a need for recognition that only an
assertive attitude can help to make progress to-
wards lastrng peace rn Bosnia and Herzegovina.
A sensrblc poho' cannot be held hostage to the
possibrlity of casualtres It should also be borne
in mrnd that the Russians must be consulted on
operations in Bosnra and that thel' cannot be
pushed rnto a rolc of u'ater carriers
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APPENDIX
Contribution by Mr Jelincic, Delegation of the Republic of SIovenia,
following avisit to Kosovofrom 16-21 October 1997
I The srtuation tn Kosovo is agam detcrto-
ratrng due to the reacttvation of radrcal move-
ments amongst the Kosovo Albanians. The
movement of so-called passive resistance, u'hose
officral leader was Ibrahim Rugova, rs slon'ly
being pushed rnto the background as a result of
rising tension even in his onn party'
2 In the y'ears follorving the collapse of for-
mer Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians tried to form
a body of parallel govemment rvhich tt u'as
thought rvould be more successful in keeping the
Kosovo Albanians in tsolatton Thev arc trying
to shou' the international communtty lvhat "the
problem" is and are pushing the centres of uorld
power to intervene in this part of Yugoslavia
An illegal (or "shadorv") state has been formed
and controls u'ith van'ing degrees of success the
movement of goods and monev as u'ell as life in
the commurutv of Kosovo Albanians. The
authorities of this state have been set up in the
form of government bodres, mmistries, parallel
schools, a unrvcrsity' and financtal associattons
Special emphasrs has becn placed on setting up a
tax-collectron bodl'u-hrch has collected a consid-
erable amount of mone1, m Kosovo and a great
deal more from Albanian uorkers (Gastarberter)
rn \\.estern Europe and the Unrted States.
Rugova u'as unable to control all the politrcal
movements estabhshed among Kosovo Albani-
ans
3 Nori the srtuatron has changed Whrle this
mode of organisatron has not brought concrete
rcsults. Rugova's rdea of an rndependent Kosovo
has becn compromrsed The tnternattonal com-
munitv is mcreasrnglv takrng the r,teu' that
Kosovo is an rntcrnal matter for Scrbla. that no
border changes should be madc and that Albanr-
ans should be treated morc and more as a mrnor-
itv communrtv rn Serbra
4 This has inflamcd the radrcal Albanran
movements uhose talk about morc scrious forms
of strugglc ven' soon turned rnto a polrtrcal real-
rt1, rn Kosovo rn the form of terronsm Over the
last tso 1ears. Albanlan tcrronsts have krllcd
about 
-50 pohce officers and crytltans tn Kosovo.
Thc illegal organlsatron behrnd sucir acts of tsr-
rorism rs the Oslobodrlacko volska Kosova -
"the Liberation arml' of Kosovo". It ts organtsed
along the hnes of othcr Europcan terrorist or-
ganrsations (such as thc IRA and ETA) and uses
all the means at its disposal in the fight against
Serbians and Kosovo Albanians llho are lo1'al to
thc state. Albanran sources state that the head-
quarters of this organisatton are ln Srvitzerland
and that rt has other big centres in Germanl' and
Srveden Almost all the members of this terrorist
organisation are trarned at militan' bases in Al-
banra They are recrutted for such training by'thc
illcgal government of the so-called Repubhc
Kosovo.lts leader. Bujar Bukoshi. as rvell as the
malontl' of members of thrs government, hve in
Ulm, Germanl' Bukoshi appropnated a large
part of the money collected from Albanrans
rvorkrng abroad by llepubhc Kosovo and be-
cause of this quarrellcd u'rth Ibrahim Rugova
What started as drsagreement behreen them de-
veloped mto open hostrlrtv. prompting Bukoshr to
found a ncu' polrtrcal movement conststing of
drssatisfied students u'ho havc successfulll' or-
ganised demonstratlons in Pristlna to tn to shorv
the intemational communrtl' that therr standpoint
is the onll' justrfied one.
5 All these terronst attacks and student pro-
tests, combrned u'ith instabrlrty rn the Albanian
border areas (even'da1'therc are atLacks by' rob-
bers from Albanra tn the regton of Kosovo u'here
peoplc from the border vrllages are berng mo-
lested), are very dangcrous srgnals that the situa-
tlon rn Kosovo mrght bccome much u'orsc Al-
banians are bringrng large quantrttes of \\'capons
rnto Kosovo About 6-i0 000 AK--l7s rn drfferent
verslons and a large numbe r of hcarl armamcnts
have bccn stolen from dcpots rn Albanra thrs
1'ear. On thc biack markct tn Albanra an AK-47
can be bought for as hftlc as DNI 10 and manl'
such u'eapons are berng smuggled rnto Kosol'o
whcre thev are no\\. ln thc hands of Albanran ter-
ronsts Tcrronsm has nou becomc thc greatest
srngle dangcr to pcacc rn thrs rcgton
6 Quite a numbcr of Albanran partlcs arc
rncreastnglv endorstng the radrcal methods of
strugglc cmplored b1' Kosovo indcpendencc
movcmcnts One has the fceltng. and thcre rs
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also a certain amount of tangible evidence, that
some international diplomats are supporting the
Kosovo Albanians in their course of action. In
the first place there is Albania, whrch is giving
the separatists every possible support. The Al-
banian media, especialll, the state television
authoritres, are contributrng to the national feel-
ing of impatience and are also inciting anti-Serb
hate among the Kosovo Albanians. Indirectly,
this terronsm is receiving support from some
European states. For example, the terrorist or-
ganisation Oslobodilacka vojsko Kosova has
formed the foundatron Domovina zove 
- 
"the
Fatherland calls" 
- 
in Sweden. Switzerland and
Germany. Thrs foundatron is collecting funds for
the organisation. Accordrng to Albanian sources,
it has the status of a humanitarian organisation rn
Germany and donors beneht from tax exemp-
tions This is also a way of supportrng terrorism
in Kosovo.
7. Kosovo Albanians thrnk that bv rntensifo-
ing terrorist attacks and increasing tension by'
holdrng all kinds of demonstrations. the1, rvrll
force the international communit), to create a
special status for Kosovo and that the creation of
an independent state will then be the next logical
step.
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